Manila Electric Company v. Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 71393 · 1989-06-28 · J. MEDIALDEA, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Property Law
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Nazario Crisostomo and Maria Escusar owned a parcel of land. Upon their death, it passed to their daughter Bibiana Crisostomo Vda. de Eladio Leyva, and subsequently to her children, the LEYVAs. Between 1929 and 1930, MERALCO erected two transmission steel towers on portions of this land, which were later covered by TCT Nos. 297168 and 338524. No encumbrance was annotated on the original certificate of title (OCT 4416) when it was issued in 1931. Procedural History: On August 4, 1973, the LEYVAs filed a complaint against MERALCO for damages and compensation due to MERALCO's continued use of their property, claiming the property became unusable because of the high voltage electric current. MERALCO asserted it had a perpetual easement of right of way acquired through a grant from the original owner, Nazario Crisostomo, for which it paid $12.40. MERALCO also argued that even without the grant, the LEYVAs' claim was barred by prescription and laches due to MERALCO's 43 years of open, continuous, and uninterrupted enjoyment. MERALCO failed to present proof of the alleged contract/grant, relying instead on the deposition of a retired MERALCO field auditor, Leland Gardner, as secondary evidence. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the LEYVAs, awarding temperate damages, annual compensation for loss of use, legal interest, and attorney's fees. MERALCO appealed. The Petition: The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the RTC's decision in toto. MERALCO filed a petition for review by way of certiorari under Rule 45, seeking to overturn the appellate court's ruling that it had not acquired a perpetual easement of right of way over the LEYVAs' property.

Issue(s)

Whether MERALCO acquired a perpetual easement of right of way over the LEYVAs' property by title. Whether MERALCO acquired the easement by prescription. Whether the LEYVAs' cause of action is barred by prescription or laches. Whether the LEYVAs are entitled to temperate damages and annual compensation for loss of use and opportunity to profit from their lands. Whether the LEYVAs are entitled to attorney's fees.

Ruling

The petition is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED in toto. MERALCO did not acquire a perpetual easement of right of way over the LEYVAs' property. The LEYVAs are entitled to compensation for damages, loss of use, and attorney's fees.

Ratio Decidendi

On the acquisition of easement by title: The Court affirmed the respondent court's ruling that MERALCO failed to prove the existence of a contract or grant for a perpetual easement of right of way. MERALCO's attempt to present secondary evidence through the deposition of Leland Gardner was deemed inadmissible because satisfactory proof of the former existence and proper execution of the alleged grant was not established. Gardner's testimony was based on assumptions and secondary information, not direct knowledge of the execution of the grant by Nazario Crisostomo. The testimony regarding the payment of $12.40 and the alleged burning of documents during the war did not sufficiently prove the genuineness and execution of the purported grant. On the acquisition of easement by prescription: The Court reiterated the principle that possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title (en concepto de dueño). Acts merely tolerated by the owner produce no effect with respect to possession and, consequently, cannot start the running of the period of prescription. In this case, the initial use of the property by MERALCO was presumed to be based on the mere tolerance or license of the original owner, Nazario Crisostomo, as there was no evidence that MERALCO's use began under an assertion of right. The subsequent actions of MERALCO, such as negotiating to purchase the lot and the LEYVAs' complaints after the war, further indicated that MERALCO's possession was not adverse. On prescription and laches: The Court found that the LEYVAs' action was not barred by prescription or laches. The evidence showed that the LEYVAs complained against MERALCO's use of the premises after the war, and MERALCO even negotiated for the purchase of the lot in 1968. The filing of the present action on August 7, 1973, after their demand for compensation was refused, was within the prescriptive period. The acts of MERALCO and the LEYVAs' subsequent actions demonstrated that the possession was not adverse and that the LEYVAs actively asserted their rights. On damages and compensation: The Court upheld the award of temperate damages and annual compensation for the loss of use and deprivation of opportunity to profit from the lands. It was established that the LEYVAs' property was practically off-limits due to the danger posed by the high voltage electric current, preventing them from reaping profits and benefits while still being liable for real estate taxes. This situation caused prejudice to the LEYVAs, entitling them to redress for the loss of use and enjoyment of their property. On attorney's fees: The Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, recognizing that the LEYVAs were compelled to litigate to protect their rights and recover compensation for the damages and loss of use of their property caused by MERALCO's unauthorized occupation.

Main Doctrine

A claim for an easement of right of way based on a supposed grant must be substantiated by proof of the grant's execution. In the absence of such proof, and where the initial use of the property was merely tolerated by the owner, prescription cannot be acquired even with long-standing use, as such possession is not adverse. The owner's right to compensation for the loss of use and enjoyment of the property remains.

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