Rivera v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioners, Atty. Cornelio T. Rivera and Augusto Palomar, are landowners who allege that the private respondent, La Vista Association, Inc., unlawfully closed and obstructed Mangyan Road, a public street within their subdivision, in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 7613-S-68. This ordinance prohibits the obstruction of public access to subdivision streets. The petitioners claim ownership of a parcel of land purchased from Maryknoll College Foundation, Inc., which had granted them a right of way over one-half of Mangyan Road. They contend that La Vista Association's actions on January 20, 1982, prevented vehicular traffic and access to this road, causing them and the public great and irreparable damage. 2. Procedural History: The petitioners initially filed an amended complaint for damages and injunction with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Quezon City, on July 9, 1982. On November 15, 1982, the CFI granted a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the petitioners, which was later denied reconsideration on June 14, 1983. La Vista Association then filed a petition to dissolve the writ, which the CFI denied on October 25, 1983, reiterating its earlier order. Subsequently, La Vista Association filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-66626), which was remanded to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) due to factual issues. On January 6, 1986, the IAC granted the certiorari, annulling and setting aside the CFI's orders and making the preliminary injunction permanent. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the IAC's decision was denied on April 16, 1986. 3. The Petition: This case is a petition for review of the IAC's decision. The petitioners argue that the IAC erred in holding they had not shown an unquestioned right to the use of Mangyan Road. They also contend that certiorari was an improper remedy for the IAC to grant, as the CFI had jurisdiction and the orders were interlocutory, with many factual matters in dispute. The petitioners assert their right of way based on a deed of sale with Maryknoll College, which granted them utility rights and a road right of way within the campus if La Vista Association denied access to the other half of the road. They interpret the phrase 'inside Maryknoll College Campus' to include their portion of Mangyan Road. The core of their argument is that the IAC misconstrued the deed of sale and the historical context of Mangyan Road, thereby improperly overturning the CFI's grant of injunctive relief.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners have shown an unquestionable right to the use of the Mangyan Road. Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a serious error of law in granting the Petition for Certiorari.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the petitioners have shown an unquestionable right to the use of the Mangyan Road: The Court held that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, a party must establish an unquestionable right over the premises and that such right has been violated. The petitioners' claim to a right of way over one-half of Mangyan Road was based on a deed of sale with mortgage from Maryknoll College. This deed granted a right of way for utilities over one-half of Mangyan Road and a road right of way inside the Maryknoll College Campus in the event La Vista Subdivision Association refused access to the other half. The Court found the phrase "inside Maryknoll College Campus" ambiguous and considered the historical background of the road. However, it concluded that the deed of sale, executed in 1979, did not grant a general road right of way over the portion of Mangyan Road owned by Maryknoll College, but only for specific utilities. Furthermore, Maryknoll College had provided alternative roads within its campus leading to Katipunan Avenue, which the petitioners did not refute. The Court emphasized that a right of way should be asserted against the party to the contract (Maryknoll College), not against La Vista Association, which was not a party to the deed of sale. The Court also cited Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., stating that mere convenience is not enough to justify an easement of right of way; a real necessity is required. Therefore, the petitioners did not possess a clear right over the disputed portion of Mangyan Road. On the issue of whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a serious error of law in granting the Petition for Certiorari: The Court affirmed the IAC's decision. It reasoned that since the petitioners failed to establish a clear and unquestionable right over the one-half portion of Mangyan Road, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court was improper. The Court reiterated the principle that to warrant an injunction, there must exist the right to be protected and a violation of that right. In this case, the trial court issued the writ without first satisfying these requisites, thereby committing a grave abuse of discretion. The Court cited Maguan v. Court of Appeals and Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. v. Quintillan to support the view that certiorari is the appropriate remedy to correct such grave abuse of discretion committed by a lower court in issuing an injunction when the necessary conditions are not met. Thus, the IAC correctly granted the petition for certiorari.
Main Doctrine
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, a party must demonstrate an unquestionable right over the premises and that such right has been violated. Mere convenience is insufficient to establish a right to an easement of right of way; a real necessity must be shown.