Alejandro v. People of the Philippines
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Dr. Arturo L. Alejandro served as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the President Ferdinand E. Marcos Emergency Hospital (FEMEH) from March 20, 1982, to July 31, 1982. During this period, he concurrently held the position of Chief of the Aglipay Emergency Hospital. In September 1982, 30 employees of FEMEH filed a complaint alleging that during petitioner's term as OIC, hospital funds for the third quarter of 1982 (July-September), amounting to P93,950.00 for personnel services and P74,500.00 for maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE), were depleted, leaving only P168.00. Consequently, employees were not paid their salaries and allowances for the latter half of July and the months of August and September 1982. Procedural History: The complaint was referred to the Tanodbayan, which led to an NBI investigation. The NBI recommended further investigation due to the absence of vital evidence to ascertain specific liabilities. The Regional Health Office also conducted an investigation. Subsequently, two informations were filed: one for Technical Malversation (Criminal Case No. 9721) and another for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Criminal Case No. 10947). The Sandiganbayan acquitted the accused of Technical Malversation due to lack of proof of fund diversion. However, in Criminal Case No. 10947, the Sandiganbayan found Dr. Alejandro, Virgilio P. Bunao (Administrative Officer), and Cesar R. Dupa (Bookkeeper) guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, sentencing them to imprisonment and perpetual disqualification. The Sandiganbayan noted that no civil liability was adjudged as the employees were eventually paid their back salaries. The Petition: Dr. Alejandro filed a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that in signing the disbursing checks for July 1982, he did not act with evident bad faith or gross negligence, as he derived no pecuniary benefit and merely ministerially signed the checks after verifying the necessary signatures and approvals. He contended that good faith and lack of malice are valid defenses. The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the over-expenditure and failure to pay salaries constituted a violation of Section 3(e) and amounted to gross negligence, negating good faith.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner, Dr. Arturo L. Alejandro, committed a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 by signing disbursing checks that resulted in an over-expenditure and non-payment of salaries, considering his reliance on certifications and the eventual payment of salaries. Whether the petitioner acted with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in approving the disbursements, considering his role, the established practices, and the absence of personal benefit.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated July 30, 1987, in Criminal Case No. 10947, finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of the charge.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Issue of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and Petitioner's Culpability: The Court held that for a conviction under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the act causing undue injury must be committed with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court found that the petitioner, as Chief of Hospital, relied on the certifications of the Bookkeeper regarding the availability of funds and the Administrative Officer regarding the necessity and lawfulness of the expenditure. The established procedure required the Bookkeeper to certify the availability of funds and the Administrative Officer to certify the necessity and lawfulness of the expenditure before the Chief of Hospital approved the disbursement. The Court emphasized that it would be too harsh and inequitable to impose criminal liability upon a public officer who was misled into approving a disbursement based on the Bookkeeper's certification of fund availability, even if such fund turned out to be unavailable. The petitioner's reliance on these certifications, which led to the application of personnel services funds to MOOE, could not be classified as "gross inexcusable negligence." There was no evident bad faith or malicious intent on his part to cause undue injury. The Court noted that a crucial element of the crime under Section 3(e) is the causing of undue injury to any party. However, the Sandiganbayan itself recognized that there was no proof of damage caused to the employees of the hospital, as they were eventually paid their salaries for the entire third quarter of 1982 on October 27, 1982. This fact further weakened the prosecution's case, as the alleged undue injury, a necessary component of the offense, was not proven to have persisted or caused lasting damage. The Court also considered that a portion of the personnel services fund was used to pay back salaries of employees for the second quarter of 1982, which was not an improper diversion of funds but rather a legitimate payment of arrears. On Petitioner's Role and Good Faith: The Court found that the petitioner acted as OIC for only about four months and concurrently held another position, making it unreasonable to expect him to personally verify the hospital's books of accounts for every disbursement. His act of relying on the Bookkeeper's certification was not gross inexcusable negligence, especially since the practice of transferring funds from one quarter to a preceding one had been a practice since 1978, carried over during his term. The Court reiterated that good faith and lack of malice are valid defenses to the charge of violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Given that the petitioner did not derive any pecuniary benefit and was misled by subordinate officials, his actions were deemed to be in good faith.
Main Doctrine
A public officer who relies in good faith on the certifications of subordinate officials regarding the availability of funds for disbursement, and who does not act with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, cannot be held liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, especially when no undue injury is ultimately caused to any party.