Heirs of Ildefonso Coscolluela, Sr., Inc. v. Rico General Insurance Corporation

G.R. No. 84628 · 1989-11-16 · J. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: · Primary: Commercial; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner, Heirs of Ildefonso Coscolluela, Inc., was the registered owner of a vehicle insured with private respondent Rico General Insurance Corporation for P100,000.00, covering the period from October 1, 1986, to October 1, 1987. On August 28, 1987, the insured vehicle was severely damaged when fired upon by unidentified armed persons at Hacienda Puyas, Murcia, Negros Occidental, resulting in four fatalities. Petitioner filed a claim for P80,000.00 for repairs, which was refused by the insurer. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action because the incident was an excepted risk under the policy, specifically citing provisions related to civil commotion, mutiny, rebellion, insurrection, or usurped power. The RTC dismissed the complaint, stating the damage arose from a civil commotion, and denied reconsideration. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, but the RTC refused to transmit the records, stating that a petition for certiorari was the appropriate remedy. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC's dismissal order and ruled that appeal was the proper remedy. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the CA's decision.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for damages on the ground of lack of cause of action, specifically regarding the establishment of a cause of action, the insurer's invocation of the exceptions clause, and the burden of proof for excepted risks. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying due course to the petition for certiorari on the ground that appeal was the proper remedy, considering the trial judge's erroneous instruction and the availability of other remedies.

Ruling

The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal order by the Regional Trial Court is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of lack of cause of action: The Court held that the allegations in the complaint sufficiently establish a cause of action. The requisites for a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission by the defendant constituting a violation of the plaintiff's right. The insurance contract created a right for the petitioner and an obligation for the insurer to compensate for insured risks. The insurer's refusal to satisfy the claim and the consequent loss incurred by the petitioner constituted a violation of this right. The Court reiterated the principle that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, limited to relevant and material facts and inferences fairly deducible therefrom, and not conclusions of law or allegations subject to judicial notice. Since the complaint merely stated the vehicle was damaged due to firing by unidentified armed men and did not explicitly intimate civil strife, the motion to dismiss could not go beyond admitting these facts. Any assertion by the private respondent regarding the cause being an excepted risk was subject to proof. The Court found the private respondent's invocation of the exceptions clause to be without merit at the dismissal stage. It reiterated the rule that limitations on liability in an insurance policy should be construed to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with its obligations. Policies with exceptions tending to work a forfeiture are interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. The facts alleged in the complaint did not provide a complete scenario of the firing incident's nature, making it incumbent upon the trial judge to receive evidence rather than summarily dispose of the case. The Court emphasized that the issue of whether the incident fell under excepted risks required factual determination through a full-blown trial, not a mere motion to dismiss. The Court agreed with the petitioner that the burden of proof to show that the insured is not liable due to an excepted risk rests on the private respondent. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court mandates that each party must prove their affirmative allegations. Where an insurer denies liability based on an excepted risk but fails to establish this fact by concrete proofs, the insurer is liable under the policy. The dismissal order without a hearing and reception of evidence to prove the incident was a result of civil commotion, rebellion, or insurrection constituted reversible error. On the propriety of the certiorari petition: The Court found that the petitioner's claim that the CA erred in denying due course to the petition for certiorari was valid. While certiorari is generally not a substitute for appeal, the records showed that the petitioner intended to appeal, but the trial judge rendered this remedy unfeasible by refusing to transmit the records and incorrectly advising the petitioner to file a certiorari petition. Under such circumstances, where there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a special civil action of certiorari was the only available recourse to determine if the dismissal order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA failed to appreciate the petitioner's predicament, and the trial judge's erroneous instruction compounded the problem. The Court deemed the trial judge's April 6, 1988 order, stating that the appropriate remedy was a petition for review by way of certiorari, as deplorable. The judge failed to distinguish between an original petition for certiorari and a petition for review by way of certiorari. A petition for review is applicable when assailing an adverse decision of an RTC in its appellate capacity, not an original dismissal order of an RTC. The proper remedy for the dismissal order was an ordinary appeal, which the petitioner initially pursued but was thwarted by the trial judge's actions. The filing of the petition for certiorari was therefore proper, as the petitioner had satisfactorily shown that the trial judge acted whimsically and in total disregard of evidence.

Main Doctrine

A motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the material facts alleged in the complaint. The insurer bears the burden of proving that a loss falls within an excepted risk. A petition for certiorari is a proper remedy when an appeal is rendered unfeasible by the trial court's actions.

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