Llamado v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84850 · 1989-06-29 · J. FELICIANO, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado, Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation, along with Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President, were prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. They co-signed a postdated check for P186,500.00, which was dishonored for insufficient funds. The trial court convicted petitioner Llamado alone, sentencing him to one year imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and reimbursement to the private respondent. Procedural History: Petitioner orally manifested his intention to appeal, and the records were forwarded to the Court of Appeals. After securing several extensions to file his Appellant's Brief, with the last one expiring on November 18, 1987, petitioner filed a Petition for Probation with the Regional Trial Court on November 30, 1987. This was not accepted as the records were already with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner then filed a "Manifestation and Petition for Probation" with the Court of Appeals, seeking probation or remand to the trial court and for the period to file his brief to be held in abeyance. Subsequently, petitioner formally withdrew his appeal conditioned on the approval of his Petition for Probation. The Solicitor General had no objection, but the private respondent commented. The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Probation, with a dissenting opinion, and petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review and reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that his application for probation, filed after notice of appeal but before the actual filing of his brief, should not be barred under Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

Issue(s)

Whether petitioner's application for probation, filed after a notice of appeal but before the actual filing of his Appellant's Brief, is barred under Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990. Whether the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" and the clause "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction" in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1990 should be interpreted strictly according to procedural rules or liberally in favor of the accused.

Ruling

The petition is denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Petitioner's application for probation is barred.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of whether petitioner's application for probation is barred: The Court held that under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1990, an application for probation must be filed "within the period for perfecting an appeal." The proviso explicitly states that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." The period for perfecting an appeal is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, perfected by filing a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner's oral manifestation in open court at the time of promulgation was considered equivalent to a written notice of appeal, thus perfecting his appeal. Therefore, his subsequent application for probation was filed after the perfection of his appeal, rendering it barred under the law. The Court emphasized that the language of Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. On the interpretation of "period for perfecting an appeal" and the legislative intent: The Court rejected the petitioner's argument for a liberal interpretation of the law in his favor. It stated that the Probation Law is not a penal statute, but even if it were, courts cannot invoke liberal interpretation to disregard clear statutory language. The Court found no ambiguity in the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" and the proviso in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1990. These terms refer to the established procedural rules for perfecting an appeal, which is fifteen days. The Court stressed that judges must apply statutes as written and cannot substitute their own ideas of what the legislature ought to have done. The "whereas" clauses of P.D. No. 1990, while indicating general purpose, do not control the specific terms of the amended Section 4. The Court reiterated that its duty is to ascertain the meaning of the words used by the legislature and not to rewrite the statute.

Main Doctrine

An application for probation under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1990 must be filed within the period for perfecting an appeal, and no application shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.

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