Adamson Ozanam Educational Institution, Inc. v. Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association (AUFEA) filed a complaint against Adamson University (AU) for the recovery of 60% of the tuition fee increase granted to AU by the Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports (MECS) for the school year 1983-84. AUFEA contended that this 60% should be allocated for salary and wage increases for its members, as purportedly mandated by P.D. No. 451. AU argued that P.D. No. 451 was repealed by the Educational Act of 1982 and that, in any event, no benefits were due as there were no actual incremental proceeds from the tuition fee increase. 2. Procedural History: The labor arbiter initially dismissed AUFEA's complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed this decision, ordering AU to remit P1,298,160.00 to AUFEA, representing the 60% share in tuition fee increments for the 1983-84 school year. AU's motion for reconsideration was denied for being filed out of time. AU then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which initially dismissed the petition. However, upon AU's motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court granted the motion, reviewed the case, and ultimately reversed the NLRC's decision, reinstating the labor arbiter's dismissal of the complaint. 3. The Petition: Adamson University filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the NLRC's decision was erroneous on two grounds. First, it contended that the service of the NLRC decision upon the security guard of the building where its former counsel's office was located was ineffective, thus the period for filing a motion for reconsideration had not commenced. Second, it argued that the NLRC's decision was contrary to established jurisprudence, specifically the ruling in Cebu Institute of Technology et al. vs. Hon. Blas Ople, et al., which held that P.D. No. 451 was repealed by the Educational Act of 1982, thereby altering the disposition of incremental tuition fee proceeds.
Issue(s)
Whether the service of the NLRC decision upon the security guard of the building where petitioner's former counsel used to hold office was legally effective. Whether the NLRC decision ordering the remittance of 60% of the incremental tuition proceeds was contrary to law, considering the repeal of P.D. No. 451 by B.P. Blg. 232 and the applicable MECS Order.
Ruling
The motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolution of February 22, 1989, is set aside. The petition is granted, and the questioned decision of the NLRC dated September 30, 1988, and its resolution dated January 30, 1989, are reversed and set aside. The decision of the labor arbiter dated March 31, 1986, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of service of the decision: The Court held that the service of the NLRC decision dated September 30, 1988, upon the security guard of the building where petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Andres Narvasa, used to hold office, was an invalid service. Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which is suppletory to NLRC rules, requires personal service by delivering a copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or a person having charge thereof. A security guard of the building is neither a clerk nor a person in charge of the attorney's office as contemplated by the rules. Therefore, the decision did not become executory, and the period for filing a motion for reconsideration did not commence from such service. The Court also noted that the NLRC could have taken judicial notice of the elevation of Atty. Narvasa to the Supreme Court, as this is a matter of public knowledge relevant to the case. The subsequent filing of the motion for reconsideration by the new counsel on November 15, 1988, was therefore timely. On the merits of the case and the application of P.D. No. 451 and B.P. Blg. 232: The Court disagreed with the NLRC's ruling that AU could not charge certain items, including collective bargaining agreement benefits, to the 60% incremental tuition proceeds. The Court reiterated its ruling in Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Hon. Blas Ople that P.D. No. 451 was repealed by the Educational Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232), which took effect on September 11, 1982. Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 provides that not less than sixty percent (60%) of the incremental tuition proceeds shall be used for salaries or wages, allowances, and fringe benefits of faculty and support staff, including those prescribed by collective bargaining agreements. Thus, the limitation in Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 451, which restricted the disposition of the 60% to salaries and wages, was abrogated. MECS Order No. 25, which finds support in B.P. Blg. 232, should be given retroactive effect from September 11, 1982, not April 1, 1985. Consequently, the NLRC committed a grave error in ruling that petitioner could not charge collective bargaining agreement benefits and other items under MECS Order No. 25 to the 60% incremental proceeds.
Main Doctrine
Service of a court decision upon a security guard of the building where the counsel for a party used to hold office is an invalid service, and the period for filing an appeal or motion for reconsideration does not commence from such service. Furthermore, the Educational Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) repealed P.D. No. 451, and the disposition of the 60% incremental tuition proceeds is governed by B.P. Blg. 232, which allows for broader application beyond just salaries and wages, including collective bargaining agreements.