Deloso v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 86899-903 · 1989-05-15 · J. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: · Primary: Criminal Law; Secondary: Administrative Law, Constitutional Law
MODIFICATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Amor D. Deloso, then Provincial Governor of Zambales, was accused of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) for allegedly giving unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer by leasing a municipal tractor without rental agreement, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan. Five separate informations were filed against him before the Sandiganbayan. Procedural History: A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan, and a subsequent petition to this Court (G.R. Nos. 69963-67) seeking to annul these resolutions was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for his preventive suspension pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 3019. The Petition: The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on February 10, 1989, suspending petitioner pendente lite from his position as Provincial Governor and any other office he may be holding. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari to annul this resolution, arguing that the indefinite suspension violates due process and equal protection. He also sought to enjoin the implementation of the suspension order.

Issue(s)

Whether the preventive suspension of petitioner Amor D. Deloso by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 is valid, and whether its duration violates due process and equal protection. Whether the ruling in Garcia v. The Executive Secretary is applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law and suspended under Section 13 thereof. Whether the amendment to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended by Batasan Pambansa Blg. 192, applies to the petitioner who is now occupying a different office than the one he was charged with.

Ruling

The petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner Amor D. Deloso by the Sandiganbayan is limited to ninety (90) days. After this period, Deloso shall resume the functions of governor of Zambales, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial of the pending cases against him. The decision is immediately executory.

Ratio Decidendi

On the validity of preventive suspension, its duration, due process, and equal protection: The Court reiterated that while preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. 3019 may be justified, its continuance for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. The petitioner, an elected governor, was suspended indefinitely, and the Sandiganbayan denied his plea for earlier trial dates due to its heavy caseload and priority given to other cases. This indefinite suspension, especially considering the relatively short term of an elective office, becomes unreasonable and oppressive. The Court found that the interests of the sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the heavy caseload of the courts. The prolonged suspension could effectively deprive the people of the services of their elected official for his entire term, nullifying the will of the electorate. Therefore, the order of suspension without a definite period could not be sanctioned. The Court applied the principles established in Layno v. Sandiganbayan and Garcia v. The Executive Secretary. In Garcia, it was held that indefinite preventive suspension of a public officer, even if appointed by the President, would countenance a situation where the suspension becomes the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the Constitution and Civil Service Law. This principle was extended to elective officials in Layno, emphasizing that the people are entitled to the services of their elected officials, and protracted suspension deprives them of such services, constituting a denial of due process and injustice to both the official and the electorate. The guarantee of equal protection necessitates the application of the same rule against indefinite suspension to elective officials facing criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law. On the applicability of Garcia v. The Executive Secretary: The Court affirmed that the ruling in Garcia, which prohibited indefinite preventive suspension, applies with greater force to elective officials. The rationale is that elective officials are directly accountable to the people, and their indefinite suspension deprives the electorate of their chosen representative. The principle against indefinite suspension, established for national government officials in Garcia, should not be negated for elective local officials, as doing so would violate the safeguard of equal protection. The mere fact that the petitioner is facing charges under the Anti-Graft Law does not justify a different rule of law that would permit indefinite suspension. On the applicability of the amended Section 13 of R.A. 3019: The petitioner's argument that the amended provision, which refers to an "incumbent" public officer, does not apply to him because he is now governor and not mayor (the position he held when charged) was found untenable. Citing Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the use of the word "office" in the amended provision means it applies to any office the charged officer may be holding, not just the specific office under which the charge was filed. Therefore, the suspension provision applies to petitioner regardless of his current position as governor.

Main Doctrine

Preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 must be limited to ninety (90) days to avoid violating due process and equal protection guarantees, especially when the continuation of the suspension would unduly prolong and potentially exceed the officer's term.

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