Armigos v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a civil complaint filed by Cristito Mata against Rudy Gleo Armigos for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. The Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, ruled in favor of Mata. Armigos received a copy of this decision on June 8, 1977. 2. Procedural History: Armigos filed a notice of appeal on June 9, 1977, and completed the other requirements for appeal, including the appeal bond and appellate court docket fee, on June 24, 1977. However, the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur dismissed the appeal, deeming it filed beyond the reglementary period. Armigos then filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, arguing that his appeal was timely. The Court of Appeals dismissed this petition and denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration. 3. The Petition: Armigos seeks a review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision. He contends that the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing his appeal, arguing that the appeal period should be computed from the exact hour of receipt of the municipal court's decision. He asserts that only fifteen days elapsed between his receipt of the decision and the perfection of his appeal. The petition challenges the Court of Appeals' rejection of this interpretation and its reliance on precedent that treats days as discrete units for computing appeal periods.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting petitioner's novel interpretation of the computation of the reglementary period for appeal, specifically whether the period should commence from the exact hour of receipt of the decision, and consequently, whether the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The dismissal of the appeal by the Court of First Instance, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is sustained.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court found no merit in the petitioner's argument for an hourly computation of the reglementary period for appeal. The Court reiterated the established rule found in Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included." This rule is similar to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court, which similarly exclude the first day and include the last. The Court emphasized that in applying this rule, "day" is considered synonymous with "date," rejecting the novel interpretation that would consider the exact hour of receipt of a decision. The Court cited the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Encarnacion which held that a law effective upon approval on 16 June 1950 took effect from the very first minute or hour of said day, not the exact hour of signing. The Court further noted that an hourly computation would lead to confusing situations and unreliable testimonies due to the frailty of human memory regarding exact hours. While acknowledging that appeals in habeas corpus cases require a 48-hour period from notice of judgment, this is an exception not applicable to ordinary appeals. The Court underscored that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and without justifiable reasons like fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, courts lack jurisdiction to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. Since the petitioner failed to prove any such justifying circumstance, his appeal, filed on June 24, 1977, which was the 16th day after receiving the decision on June 8, 1977 (excluding June 8, the 15-day period ended on June 23), was correctly deemed belated by the lower courts.
Main Doctrine
The computation of the reglementary period to appeal considers the day as synonymous with the date, excluding the first day and including the last day, and does not commence from the exact hour of receipt of a decision. The perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.