People v. Lualhati
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Appellant Vicente Lualhati was charged with Rape by Josephine Dimaunahan, the 11-year-old daughter of his common-law wife. The complainant alleged that the sexual intercourse occurred in June 1978, and that prior to this, Lualhati had several sexual relations with her. Lualhati had been living with the complainant's mother for about eight years without marriage, and he supported the complainant and treated her like his own daughter. Procedural History: After preliminary investigation, an information was filed charging Lualhati with rape by means of force and intimidation, with the aggravating circumstances of relationship and dwelling. Lualhati pleaded not guilty. He filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the complaint charged more than one offense and that he had been pardoned by the offended party, her mother, and grandmother through a joint affidavit of desistance. The offended party's father also executed an affidavit objecting to the pardon, asserting his patria potestas. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss. After trial, the court a quo convicted Lualhati of rape and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Petition: The appellant appealed, alleging errors in the trial court's denial of his motions to dismiss, specifically regarding the validity of the complaint, the effect of the pardon, and the authority of the father to prosecute.
Issue(s)
Whether the complaint is void for charging more than one offense. Whether the pardon granted by the offended party, her mother, and grandmother extinguished the criminal liability of the accused. Whether the father of the offended party had the authority to prosecute the accused despite having abandoned her.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding Vicente Lualhati guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant was also ordered to pay moral damages and costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the complaint charging more than one offense: The argument that the complaint is void for charging multiple offenses has no merit. While the complaint stated "in or about the month of June 1978," an attached sworn statement from the complainant categorically affirmed that the abuse occurred before the start of classes in June 1978. This affidavit, considered part of the complaint, cured any ambiguity regarding the number of offenses. Discrepancies in the exact time of occurrence do not affect essential rights if the acts occurred within the period alleged and the differences are formal rather than substantial, as held in Delos Santos vs. People. Furthermore, Section 10, Rule 110 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that the precise time of the offense need not be stated unless it is a material ingredient, and the act may be alleged as near to the actual date as possible. On the efficacy of the pardon: Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code states that rape shall not be prosecuted if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian. However, this pardon comes too late to extinguish criminal liability if granted after the filing of the complaint in court, as it fails to hide the shameful occurrence from public notice. In People vs. Miranda, this Court interpreted that while pardon extinguishes criminal action, it does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if granted after the cause has been instituted. The only act that extinguishes the penal action is the marriage between the offender and the offended party. On the father's authority to prosecute: The trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss based on the father's insistence to prosecute. The offended party was only eleven years old when the crime was committed, and thus did not have "a will of her own" to validly pardon the accused. The father, despite having abandoned the victim, still possessed patria potestas in the absence of a judicial pronouncement depriving him of parental authority over a child below twelve years old. His objection to the pardon and insistence on prosecution were therefore valid.
Main Doctrine
A pardon granted by the offended party, her mother, and grandmother after the filing of the complaint in court is too late to extinguish the criminal action for rape, as it fails to hide the shameful occurrence from public notice. Furthermore, the father's objection to the pardon, coupled with his continued parental authority, is sufficient to warrant the prosecution of the accused.