Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from a dispute concerning property rights, specifically involving Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. and Macondray Farms, Inc. against Morris G. Carpo, Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, and the Commissioner of Land Registration. The core of the dispute appears to revolve around the registration and ownership of land, as indicated by the involvement of the Commissioner of Land Registration and the Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation. Procedural History: The case reached the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari filed by Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. and Macondray Farms, Inc. Initially, the petition was denied by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in a resolution dated January 30, 1985. A motion for reconsideration, which also included a petition to the Supreme Court en banc for a rehearing due to alleged deviations from established doctrines, was filed by the petitioners. This motion was denied by the Second Division on March 6, 1985, with an order for entry of final judgment. However, on March 20, 1985, the Second Division issued a resolution recalling the entry of final judgment, giving due course to the petition, and considering the respondents' comments as answers. This resolution was later affirmed by the Court on September 28, 1987. The current proceedings stem from an Omnibus Motion filed by respondent Morris G. Carpo seeking to annul the March 20, 1985 resolution and the September 28, 1987 decision, arguing that the January 30, 1985 resolution had already become final and executory. The Petition: The current matter before the Court is a resolution addressing an Omnibus Motion filed by respondent Morris G. Carpo. Carpo contends that the Supreme Court's decision reversing the Intermediate Appellate Court is void because the initial resolution dismissing the petition had already become final and executory, with an entry of judgment made on March 18, 1985. He argues that the subsequent resolution of March 20, 1985, which set aside the entry of judgment and gave due course to the petition, is therefore void. The Court, in its resolution, addresses these arguments, asserting that the March 20, 1985 resolution was a proper exercise of its power to recall and amend its processes, as the January 30, 1985 resolution had not yet attained finality. Furthermore, the Court finds that respondent Carpo is barred by laches and acquiescence from raising these jurisdictional issues at such a late stage, having previously accepted the recall of the entry of judgment and the granting of due course to the petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the Resolution dated March 20, 1985, recalling the entry of judgment and giving due course to the petition, was void; and whether the January 30, 1985 resolution had become final and executory despite the subsequent recall of the entry of judgment. Whether respondent Carpo is barred by laches and/or acquiescence from raising the issue of the validity of the recall of the entry of judgment.
Ruling
The Court denied respondent Carpo's Omnibus Motion, finding it devoid of merit. The Resolution dated March 20, 1985, recalling the entry of judgment and giving due course to the petition, was valid. The January 30, 1985 resolution had not yet become final and executory when it was recalled. Furthermore, respondent Carpo, by his actions and omissions, is barred by laches and/or acquiescence from raising the issue at this late stage.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the March 20, 1985 Resolution and the finality of the January 30, 1985 Resolution: The Court held that the Resolution dated March 20, 1985, was a proper exercise of the Court's inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The January 30, 1985 resolution, which denied the petition for lack of merit, had not yet attained finality as of March 20, 1985, notwithstanding the entry of judgment made on March 18, 1985. The entry of judgment on March 18, 1985, was premature and inefficacious because notice of the resolution denying reconsideration had not yet been served on the petitioners. Therefore, the Court had the authority to recall the premature entry of judgment and give due course to the petition. The Court clarified that the January 30, 1985 resolution did not become final and executory because it was seasonably recalled and set aside by the March 20, 1985 resolution. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on February 28, 1985, was filed within the reglementary period. The denial of this motion on March 6, 1985, was not yet final and executory until notice thereof was served on petitioners' counsel on March 20, 1985. Thus, the entry of judgment on March 18, 1985, was indeed premature and did not make the January 30, 1985 resolution final. On the bar of laches and acquiescence: The Court found that respondent Carpo, by his acts and omissions, was barred by laches and/or acquiescence from raising the issue of the alleged irregularity in the recall of the entry of judgment and the granting of due course to the petition. He had actively participated in the proceedings after the March 20, 1985 resolution, filing memoranda and even a motion to resolve the case on the merits. He only raised the issue of the nullity of the recall for the first time in his Omnibus Motion dated July 20, 1988, after the decision on the merits had become final and entry of judgment had been made on May 9, 1988. This conduct indicated his acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction and the regularity of the proceedings.
Main Doctrine
An entry of judgment merely records the finality of a judgment; it is not the operative act that makes the judgment final and executory. A premature entry of judgment is inefficacious. Furthermore, a party may be barred by laches and acquiescence from questioning the jurisdiction or regularity of proceedings after actively participating in the case and encountering an adverse decision.