People v. Cuaresma
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The case originated from an information filed on August 21, 1978, charging Rosie Cuaresma with oral defamation. The alleged defamatory statement, made on or about August 6, 1978, was: 'Ah paisog-isog ka kay baye diay ka sa akong bana,' which translates to 'Ah, you are trying to be tough because you are the paramour of my husband.' This imputation was made against Luz Lumacao, and the prosecution was initiated by the City Fiscal of Dumaguete. Procedural History: Rosie Cuaresma filed a motion to quash, arguing that the defamation charge, which involves an offense not prosecutable de oficio, must be initiated by a complaint from the offended party, not an information filed by the fiscal, as per Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent Judge initially denied this motion, citing Fernandez v. Lantin, and ordered the fiscal to file a verified complaint of the offended party. A new complaint, sworn to by Luz Lumacao, was filed on August 4, 1980. Subsequently, Cuaresma filed another motion to quash, this time alleging prescription. The respondent Judge granted this motion on April 15, 1981, ruling that the initial filing of the information did not interrupt the prescriptive period and that the offense had already prescribed by the time the verified complaint was filed. The fiscal's motion for reconsideration was denied, and the People filed a special civil action of certiorari nearly three years later. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Second Assistant City Fiscal of Dumaguete, filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the order of dismissal issued by the respondent Judge. The petition argued that the dismissal was an error of law. However, the Supreme Court noted several procedural defects: the petition was not filed by the Solicitor General, it was filed out of time (laches), and certiorari was being used to substitute for an appeal. The Court emphasized that the dismissal order was a final and appealable order, and the subsequent certiorari action was an improper remedy for correcting errors of judgment, especially when not constituting grave abuse of discretion. The Court also reiterated its policy on the hierarchy of courts for filing extraordinary writs, stating that direct petitions to the Supreme Court should only be allowed for special and important reasons, which were not present in this case.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of the initial information, based on the complainant's affidavit, interrupted the prescriptive period for the offense of oral defamation. Whether the subsequent filing of a verified complaint by the offended party cured the defect in the initial pleading and conferred jurisdiction upon the court. Whether the special civil action for certiorari was the proper remedy and was filed within the reglementary period and without laches. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the interruption of the prescriptive period: The Supreme Court held that the filing of the complainant's affidavit with the City Fiscal's office, which served as the basis for the preliminary investigation and the subsequent filing of the information, had indeed tolled the period of prescription. This ruling was based on the principle that the filing of a complaint or affidavit with the fiscal's office interrupts prescription, a principle later codified in the 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The Court noted that the initial information, based on the sworn complaint, should have been considered sufficient compliance with Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, and that the affidavit was part of the record. Therefore, the dismissal on the ground of prescription was an error of law. On the propriety of the remedy and timeliness: The Court found that the special civil action for certiorari was not the proper remedy and was filed with serious defects. Firstly, it was filed by an Assistant City Fiscal instead of the Solicitor General, although the Solicitor General later intervened. Secondly, and more importantly, the certiorari suit was being used to substitute for an appeal, which is impermissible. The dismissal order was a final order and was appealable. The petition for certiorari was filed almost three years after the dismissal order, without any explanation for the delay, thus being barred by laches. The Court emphasized that certiorari is limited to correcting acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and not for correcting errors of judgment which are rectifiable by appeal. On grave abuse of discretion: The Court clarified that the error committed by the respondent judge was an error of law concerning the then unsettled principle of whether filing a complaint with the fiscal's office interrupted prescription. This error did not constitute grave abuse of discretion, which implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, certiorari was not the appropriate remedy. On the hierarchy of courts: The Court reiterated its policy of strictly enforcing the hierarchy of courts. Petitions for extraordinary writs against first-level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Courts, and those against RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals. Direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons, which were not present in this case. The Court stressed the need to prevent inordinate demands on its time and to avoid overcrowding its docket.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a complaint or affidavit with the City Fiscal's office, which serves as the basis for a preliminary investigation, interrupts the running of the prescriptive period for the offense charged, even if the initial pleading filed with the court was an information instead of a formal complaint by the offended party. However, a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal and must be filed within a reasonable period, otherwise it may be barred by laches. Furthermore, direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for extraordinary writs should be reserved for cases with special and important reasons, adhering to the hierarchy of courts.