Laviña v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Maria Carmen Gabriel executed a donation mortis causa of a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila, to Josefina C. Gabriel. Later, gravely ill, Carmen executed a Last Will and Testament bequeathing the same property to Remedios C. Muyot and a smaller lot to Josefina. Carmen also executed a General Power of Attorney in favor of Remedios Muyot to manage her properties. Josefina registered an adverse claim on the Sampaloc property. Remedios Muyot, as attorney-in-fact, hired Atty. Celso D. Laviña as counsel for Carmen. Carmen then executed an Affidavit of Denial and a Revocation of Donation, repudiating the donation to Josefina. Subsequently, Remedios Muyot sold the Sampaloc property to the spouses Virgilio D. Cebrero. Carmen passed away. The Revocation of Donation was registered. Josefina filed a complaint to annul the Revocation of Donation and caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to be recorded. Summons was served on Remedios Muyot. The Cebreros registered the sale and obtained a new title. Josefina amended her complaint to nullify the Power of Attorney and the sale to the Cebreros. Atty. Laviña filed an answer for the Estate and Muyot. Josefina moved to disqualify Atty. Laviña and for the appointment of a special administrator. Judge Vicencio denied these motions, upholding Atty. Laviña's appearance and jurisdiction based on service of summons on Muyot. Procedural History: The Cebreros moved to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Before Judge Vicencio could act, Josefina filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing Judge Vicencio's order and praying for a preliminary injunction. The CA issued a restraining order. Despite this, Judge Vicencio cancelled the notice of lis pendens, believing the restraining order expired after 20 days. On Josefina's motion, the CA set aside Judge Vicencio's order, ordered the Register of Deeds to revive the lis pendens, and required Judge Vicencio, his clerk of court, and Atty. Laviña to show cause for contempt. The CA ruled that the 20-day limitation on restraining orders under BP Blg. 224 applied only to lower court judges, not to the appellate court. Petitioners Laviña, Muyot, and Cebrero filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78295) assailing the CA's contempt resolution. Subsequently, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 11260, granting Josefina's petition, annulling Judge Vicencio's orders, declaring that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Carmen's estate, ordering Atty. Laviña to refrain from representing the estate, and expunging his pleadings. The contempt incident was held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's resolution. Petitioners appealed this decision to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 79917), which was consolidated with G.R. No. 78295. The Petition: Petitioners sought to set aside the Court of Appeals' resolution and decision, arguing that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the estate and that Atty. Laviña's authority as counsel was not extinguished upon Carmen's death.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the estate of Maria Carmen P. Gabriel, and whether Atty. Celso Laviña's authority as counsel for Maria Carmen P. Gabriel was extinguished upon her death. Whether Judge Vicencio, Atty. Laviña, and the branch clerk of court were guilty of contempt for disobeying the Court of Appeals' restraining order. On the interpretation of BP Blg. 224 and its effect on the contempt charge.
Ruling
The petitions are dismissed. The Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in its assailed resolution and decision. The contempt resolution against Judge Vicencio, Atty. Laviña, and the branch clerk of court is sustained, and the decision annulling the lower court's orders and disqualifying Atty. Laviña is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction and Atty. Laviña's authority: The Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the estate of Maria Carmen P. Gabriel. The service of summons upon Remedios Muyot was void because her authority as attorney-in-fact for Carmen Gabriel was extinguished upon Carmen's death, as provided by Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code. The General Power of Attorney was for the "sole benefit" of Carmen, thus not falling under the exception in Article 1930 of the Civil Code. Consequently, Muyot was no longer capacitated to receive summons for the estate. Furthermore, Carmen's death also divested Atty. Laviña of his authority to represent her, as a deceased client cannot be represented by counsel, citing Barrameda vs. Barbara and Caisip vs. Hon. Cabangon. The Court reiterated that the estate of a deceased person can only be summoned through its executor or administrator, as provided in Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On the issue of contempt: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that Judge Vicencio, Atty. Laviña, and the branch clerk of court were guilty of contempt. While the Delbros Hotel Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court case later clarified the scope of BP Blg. 224, Judge Vicencio's disobedience of the Court of Appeals' restraining order was contemptuous regardless of his interpretation of the law. Out of respect for the appellate court, he should have obeyed the explicit mandate to desist from proceeding. His act of cancelling the notice of lis pendens shortly before his retirement, while his own jurisdiction was in question, cast doubt on his motives. The secrecy surrounding the maneuver to lift the lis pendens without notice to the other party or the Court of Appeals demonstrated bad faith and constituted contempt. On the interpretation of BP Blg. 224: The Court acknowledged the Delbros Hotel Corporation decision which held that the 20-day limitation on restraining orders under BP Blg. 224 applies to the Court of Appeals. However, this subsequent ruling did not excuse Judge Vicencio's defiance of the restraining order. The core issue was his disobedience, not the correctness of his interpretation of the law at that time. The Court emphasized that even if he believed the restraining order had expired, he should have respected the appellate court's order and awaited further instructions, rather than unilaterally cancelling the lis pendens.
Main Doctrine
Disobedience to a lawful order of the Court of Appeals, even if based on a mistaken interpretation of a statute, constitutes contempt. Furthermore, an agency relationship is extinguished upon the death of the principal, rendering the agent incapable of acting on behalf of the deceased's estate, and consequently divesting counsel of authority to represent the deceased.