Chan Sa Velasco v. Ortiz

G.R. No. L-51973 · 1990-04-16 · J. FELICIANO, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Private respondent Tan Sim Te was the ward of petitioner Ely Chan Sa Velasco and her husband Lorenzo Velasco. Lorenzo Velasco, suffering from aphasia and a brain tumor, converted his bank accounts into joint accounts with Tan Sim Te. Subsequently, Tan Sim Te withdrew the entire balances from these accounts. Lorenzo Velasco died thereafter. Procedural History: Petitioner, as administratrix of Lorenzo Velasco's estate, filed a complaint for recovery of property and annulment of documents, alleging misappropriation by Tan Sim Te. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Private respondent's new counsel filed a Motion for New Trial after the reglementary period to appeal had lapsed, citing excusable negligence in its late filing and presenting a certification from Dr. Hinigio Tan as newly discovered evidence. The respondent judge granted the Motion for New Trial, which petitioner sought to set aside via certiorari and prohibition. The Petition: Petitioner seeks to annul the respondent judge's order granting a new trial, arguing that the judgment had already become final and executory, and that the grounds for new trial were not met.

Issue(s)

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for New Trial despite the judgment having become final and executory. Whether the grounds of excusable negligence and newly discovered evidence were sufficiently established to warrant a new trial.

Ruling

The petition is granted. The orders dated July 26, 1979, and October 18, 1979, of the respondent judge are set aside and annulled. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is made permanent, and the case is remanded for execution.

Ratio Decidendi

On the propriety of granting a Motion for New Trial after the judgment has become final and executory: The Court held that a motion for new trial must be filed within the period for perfecting an appeal. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case, and its power to alter or set aside the judgment ceases. The Court emphasized that the power to suspend procedural rules in the interest of justice is reposed in an appellate court, not the trial court, and only upon a showing that substantial justice would otherwise be thwarted. The respondent judge's grant of the motion, therefore, constituted grave abuse of discretion. On the alleged excusable negligence and newly discovered evidence: The Court found the excuse of the new counsel for the late filing to be insufficient. The counsel's belief that he had the full reglementary period from the date of engagement was deemed an inexcusable error, as even a novice litigator would ascertain the date of finality. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that a busy caseload is not a valid excuse for non-compliance with reglementary periods, citing Roldan v. Republic of the Philippines, et al.. The Court ruled that Dr. Hinigio Tan's certification did not qualify as newly discovered evidence. It was shown that this evidence was known to the private respondent prior to the trial, having been submitted in a preliminary investigation. Moreover, the certification was considered merely impeaching evidence, intended to weaken Dr. Idea's findings, and not of such weight as would likely alter the result of the case, especially given the inconsistencies in the private respondent's testimony and the lack of substantiation for her claims.

Main Doctrine

A motion for new trial filed after a judgment has become final and executory, even if based on alleged excusable negligence and newly discovered evidence, cannot be granted as the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case. The proper recourse in such instances would be a petition for relief from judgment or annulment of judgment, not a motion for new trial.

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