People v. Serapio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Jose S. Serapio was charged with libel for allegedly writing, publishing, and sending by mail an anonymous communication to the Executive Secretary in December 1907. The communication contained allegations that Bonifacio Morales was a murderer, had committed various assaults and robberies, was known as a criminal to the Secret Service, and was an inveterate gambler who used diabolical methods to obtain money. These acts were committed while Morales was discharging his duties as justice of the peace of Santa Maria, Bulacan. Procedural History: The defendant, through his attorneys, filed a demurrer to the complaint on two grounds: (I) that the facts alleged do not constitute a crime, and (II) that the crime, if any, had prescribed. The trial court, through Judge Alberto Barretto, found the first ground not well-founded but sustained the second ground, ordering the prosecution to file a new complaint. The prosecution appealed this decision. The Petition: The Government appealed the trial court's decision sustaining the demurrer on the ground of prescription, arguing that the trial court erred in applying Article 131 of the Penal Code to the crime of libel defined under Act No. 277.
Issue(s)
Whether the prescription period fixed by Article 131 of the Penal Code for calumny and insults is applicable to the crime of libel as defined and punished under Act No. 277. Whether the crime of libel, as defined under Act No. 277, has prescribed.
Ruling
The judgment of the lower court sustaining the second ground of demurrer is reversed. The case is remanded to the lower court with directions to order the defendant to appear and plead to the complaint.
Ratio Decidendi
On the applicability of Article 131 of the Penal Code to libel under Act No. 277: The Court held that Article 7 of the Penal Code provides that provisions of the Penal Code do not apply to penal laws of the United States Commission unless expressly made applicable. Act No. 277, which defines and punishes libel, is a special law enacted by the Philippine Commission. The Court distinguished libel from calumny and insults under the Penal Code, noting that while there are similarities, libel under Act No. 277 has specific characteristics, particularly its requirement of being in writing and the discretion afforded to the court in fixing penalties, which differ from the Penal Code provisions on calumny and insults. The Court cited numerous previous decisions (e.g., U.S. vs. Lao Lock Hing, U.S. vs. Calaguas, U.S. vs. Fuster) where it consistently refused to apply general provisions of the Penal Code to crimes defined by special laws of the Philippine Commission, emphasizing that such special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Penal Code unless expressly stated. Therefore, the prescription period for calumny and insults under Article 131 of the Penal Code is not applicable to libel under Act No. 277. On whether the crime of libel has prescribed: The Court reasoned that prescription or limitation of actions is of purely statutory origin. In the absence of an express law fixing a period of prescription for a particular offense, the action for such offense is not barred by the mere lapse of time. The Court noted that Act No. 277, which defines and punishes libel, does not contain any provision fixing a period of prescription for the institution of an action for libel. Therefore, based on the principle that a criminal act is not prescriptible unless the law expressly fixes such prescription, and in the absence of such a provision in Act No. 277, the crime of libel in this case had not prescribed. The Court reiterated that if a period of prescription is not fixed by law, the action is not barred by the lapse of time, citing common law and civil law principles and previous rulings.
Main Doctrine
The period of prescription fixed by Article 131 of the Penal Code for calumny and insults does not apply to the crime of libel as defined and punished under Act No. 277 of the United States Commission. Unless a period of prescription or limitation is fixed by law for a particular offense or crime, the action for such offense or crime is not barred by lapse of time.