Celerian v. Tantuico, Jr.

G.R. No. 72427 · 1990-09-24 · J. FERNAN, J.: · Primary: Labor; Secondary: Administrative Law
NEW DOCTRINE

Facts

1. The Antecedents: Petitioner Ruben E. Celerian, a non-civil service eligible, was employed as a temporary service driver at the City Health Office in Pagadian City from December 1, 1980, to November 30, 1981. Following the expiration of this appointment, he continued to discharge his duties and was detailed as a casual worker from December 1, 1981, to January 31, 1982. Upon learning of his imminent replacement by another non-eligible, Virgilio Padayao, Celerian lodged a protest. Despite his temporary appointment ending on November 30, 1981, he was officially informed of his termination on February 1, 1982, the same day Padayao's appointment became effective. Celerian subsequently applied for and received his commuted leave credits and was temporarily employed in other capacities. His protest against Padayao's appointment was eventually decided in his favor, and a renewal appointment for Celerian as a temporary driver from December 1, 1981, to November 30, 1982, was approved by the Civil Service Commission. 2. Procedural History: Celerian sought payment for his salary from August 1, 1982, to November 30, 1982, during which period he alleged he was prevented from reporting for duty, citing a precedent case. His claim was forwarded to the City Auditor, who refused to act and indorsed it to the Regional Director of the Commission on Audit (COA). The COA Regional Director disallowed the claim. The Commission on Audit, in its decision dated July 25, 1984, sustained the disallowance, citing that Celerian's appointments were temporary and terminable at will, and that he had ceased to hold the position upon notice of termination. The COA denied Celerian's motion for reconsideration, leading to the present petition for review. 3. The Petition: This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the decision of the Commission on Audit. Petitioner Celerian argues that he is entitled to his salary for the period he was wrongfully prevented from performing his duties, even though his appointment was temporary. He contends that the termination was not in accordance with law, as the power to appoint and remove employees in the City Health Office at that time vested in the Secretary of Health (exercised by the Regional Director), not the City Health Officer or City Mayor. Celerian asserts that collecting his leave credits and seeking other employment were acts of economic survival under the mistaken belief of valid removal, and that the principle of 'no work, no pay' does not apply when an employee is wrongfully deprived of their office.

Issue(s)

Whether a temporarily appointed employee, wrongfully prevented from performing duties, is entitled to salary for the period of deprivation. Who has the power to appoint and remove employees of the City Health Office.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the disallowance by the Commission on Audit and directed the latter to expedite the processing and payment of petitioner's salary in the amount of P1,947.00. The decision was immediately executory.

Ratio Decidendi

On the entitlement to salary despite non-rendering of actual service: The Court held that a public official, even one with a temporary appointment, who is wrongfully prevented from entering the office and carrying out their duties, is entitled to recover salary for the duration of such wrongful deprivation. The Court emphasized that what is material is the act of wrongful deprivation of office, not the nature of the appointment. The principle applies with equal force to temporary appointees. Petitioner was prevented from reporting for duty due to circumstances beyond his control, including the delay in the approval and transmittal of his renewal appointment and the actions of administrative personnel acting under superiors' orders. His collection of terminal leave benefits and subsequent temporary employment elsewhere were acts of seeking economic survival under the honest belief of valid removal, not a waiver of his rights. The Court cited the principle that "Unless he waives his rights by abandoning the Office he may recover his salary for the time he is wrongfully prevented from entering the Office and performing its duties or for the time he is kept out of Office by wrongful removal." On the power to appoint and remove: The Court clarified that under the Revised Administrative Code, the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and employees in the City Health Office was vested in the Secretary of Health (or their delegate, the Regional Director), not the City Health Officer or the City Mayor. Petitioner's original temporary appointment was from December 1, 1980, to November 30, 1981. His subsequent detail as a casual worker was based on a memorandum order. However, the "official" termination notice on February 1, 1982, by the City Health Officer, approved by the City Mayor, was ineffective because it terminated his temporary appointment as service driver, a position to which he was later re-appointed by the Regional Director acting on behalf of the Secretary of Health. Since the power to appoint the service driver pertained to the Regional Director, the termination by the City Health Officer and City Mayor was not in accordance with law and therefore ineffective. The renewal appointment, effective from December 1, 1981, to November 30, 1982, was validly issued by the Regional Director.

Main Doctrine

A public employee, even one with a temporary appointment, who is wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of their office may recover salary for the period of wrongful deprivation, regardless of whether actual service was rendered, as the material factor is the wrongful deprivation itself, not the nature of the appointment.

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