Benedicto v. Abad Santos, Jr.
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Roberto R. Benedicto employed Salvador Pillon as a truck driver but failed to report Pillon's employment to the Social Security System (SSS) for compulsory coverage and to pay the corresponding SSS contributions from March 1971 until Pillon's death in 1974. SSS learned of this in 1975. An SSS investigator found that Benedicto admitted the failure and subsequently accomplished SSS Forms E-1 and R-1A, reporting himself and Pillon for coverage effective March 1, 1971, and was assessed P491.70 in premiums excluding penalties. Procedural History: Approximately ten years later, on July 18, 1985, an information was filed charging Benedicto with violations of Section 24(a) in relation to Section 28(e) of the Social Security Act for failure to report and register Pillon and to pay contributions, resulting in damages to Pillon's heirs amounting to P6,381.00. Benedicto filed a Motion to Quash, arguing prescription. The SSS opposed, contending a 20-year prescriptive period. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the motion, citing Section 22(b) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by PD 1636, which provides a 20-year prescriptive period. Benedicto's motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: Benedicto filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside the RTC orders. The Supreme Court impleaded the SSS as respondent.
Issue(s)
Whether the criminal action for violations of the Social Security Act has prescribed. Whether the 20-year prescriptive period under Section 22(b) of the Social Security Act applies to criminal actions. Whether the extinction of criminal liability by prescription extinguishes the civil liability.
Ruling
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with preliminary injunction is GRANTED insofar as the prosecution of the criminal action against petitioner Benedicto is concerned, declaring it prescribed. The Petition is DISMISSED insofar as the civil action for the enforcement of the civil liability arising from the offense charged is concerned, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for continuation of such civil action. The Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT regarding the criminal case and LIFTED regarding the civil action.
Ratio Decidendi
On the prescription of the criminal action: The Court held that the applicable prescriptive period for criminal violations of the Social Security Act, such as failure to register employees and remit contributions, is four (4) years under Act No. 3326, as amended. The Court reasoned that Section 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, penalizes such violations with a fine and/or imprisonment, which falls under the four-year prescriptive period provided in Section 1(b) of Act No. 3326 for offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than one month but less than two years. The Court distinguished this from Section 22(b) of the Social Security Act, which establishes a twenty (20) year prescriptive period for the "right to institute the necessary action against the employer" for the collection of delinquent contributions. The Court found that the context of Section 22(b) pertains to civil and administrative actions for collection, not criminal sanctions, and that applying a 20-year period to criminal liability would be disproportionately long compared to other penal statutes and the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, since the information was filed ten (10) years after the SSS discovered the violations, the criminal action had already prescribed. On the applicability of Section 22(b) to criminal actions: The Court clarified that Section 22(b) of the Social Security Act, as amended, does not apply to criminal actions. The Court's reasoning was based on the placement of Section 22(b) within the chapter dealing with "Sources of Funds — Employment Records and Reports," rather than in the chapter on "Penal Clauses." Furthermore, the phrase "necessary action against the employer" in Section 22(b) was interpreted to refer to actions for the collection of contributions, not criminal prosecutions. The Court also emphasized the disproportionate length of a 20-year prescriptive period for criminal offenses compared to those under the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 3326, suggesting it was not the legislative intent for Section 22(b) to cover criminal liability. On the extinction of civil liability by prescription of criminal liability: The Court affirmed the general rule that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action to enforce civil liability arising from the offense, unless the extinction proceeds from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In this case, no final judgment had been rendered, and the criminal case was aborted by the motion to quash. Therefore, the extinction of Benedicto's criminal liability by prescription did not impact the related civil action for the enforcement of his civil liability. The Court reiterated that such civil action, under Section 22(b), second paragraph, may be brought within twenty (20) years from the time the employer's delinquency was discovered. Since no reservation for a separate civil action was made, it was deemed instituted simultaneously with the criminal proceedings and could proceed.
Main Doctrine
The four (4) year prescriptive period under Act No. 3326, as amended, applies to criminal violations of the Social Security Act for failure to register employees and remit contributions, not the twenty (20) year period provided for in Section 22(b) of the Social Security Act, which pertains to civil actions for collection of contributions. The extinction of criminal liability by prescription does not extinguish the related civil action for enforcement of civil liability, which may be brought within twenty (20) years from discovery of delinquency.