Palo v. Militante
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Salem Alex Palo was apprehended by agents of the Narcotics Command in Cebu City for possession of three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes. He was subsequently charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Procedural History: On June 11, 1986, during plea bargaining, petitioner, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the offense charged, with the understanding that he would be sentenced in a manner that would qualify him for probation. The prosecution did not object. The respondent judge, after clarifying the consequences of the plea, promulgated a judgment of conviction sentencing petitioner to six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment and a fine of P6,000.00. Petitioner immediately applied for probation, and the respondent judge allowed him to remain on provisional liberty under the same bond. On June 13, 1986, the Probation Officer was ordered to conduct a post-sentence investigation. However, on August 25, 1986, the respondent judge motu proprio denied the probation application, citing a memorandum circular stating that persons sentenced to more than six (6) years are not entitled to probation. Petitioner was re-arrested on September 5, 1986. On September 15, 1986, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and to withdraw his plea of guilty, which the prosecution did not oppose. On September 19, 1986, the respondent judge denied this motion, prompting the present special civil action for certiorari. The Petition: Petitioner seeks to nullify the judgment of conviction, the order denying probation, and the order denying his motion for reconsideration. He argues that his plea of guilty was improvident, that his motion to withdraw the plea was timely, and that Batas Pambansa Blg. 76, which qualified him for probation, was not repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1990.
Issue(s)
Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in denying petitioner's omnibus motion for reconsideration, considering the finality of the judgment after the application for probation. Whether or not petitioner may still withdraw his improvident plea of guilty, considering the timeliness of the motion to withdraw the plea. Whether or not Batas Pambansa Bilang 76 was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1990 so as to disqualify petitioner from the benefits of probation.
Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit; certiorari will not lie. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and lifted the temporary restraining order.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of abuse of discretion and the finality of judgment: The Court held that Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law) explicitly state that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused applies for probation. This application is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Therefore, once the application for probation was filed, the judgment ipso facto attained finality, even if it was not yet executory. Consequently, the respondent judge was not vested with discretion to allow the withdrawal of the alleged improvident plea of guilty after the judgment had become final. The Court emphasized that the petitioner was made to understand the consequences of his plea, and his assurance from the prosecution that he could apply for probation was not a guarantee of approval. The records showed an unconditional plea, and the withdrawal of such a plea is not a matter of right but of sound discretion, which was not abused by the trial court in this instance. On the issue of withdrawing the plea and its timeliness: The Court reiterated that the filing of an application for probation operates as a waiver of the right to appeal, making the judgment final. The law requires the application for probation to be filed within the period for perfecting an appeal, not to suspend this period. In this case, the judgment was promulgated on June 11, 1986, and became final on June 26, 1986. However, the petitioner moved to withdraw his plea of guilty only on September 15, 1986, which was long after the judgment had become final. Therefore, the motion was filed out of time and could not be granted. On the repeal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 76 by Presidential Decree No. 1990: The Court affirmed that Presidential Decree No. 1990 repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 76. The Probation Law (P.D. 968) initially provided that probation benefits were not extended to those sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of more than six years. Batas Pambansa Blg. 76 amended this to "maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years and one day." However, Presidential Decree No. 1990 reverted to the original formulation of P.D. 968, excluding those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." The Court explained that this reversion indicated a policy disagreement, and the later issuance, P.D. 1990, prevailed. Therefore, petitioner, sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment, was disqualified from probation under P.D. 1990.
Main Doctrine
The filing of an application for probation operates as a waiver of the right to appeal, rendering the judgment of conviction final and precluding the withdrawal of an improvident plea of guilty.