Baranda v. Baguio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns a dispute over two parcels of land originally mortgaged by the late Lumen Baranda to the Rural Bank of Hinigaran, Inc. to secure a loan. After failing to pay the loan, the properties were foreclosed and sold at public auction to the bank, which consolidated ownership. Lumen Baranda and her sons, the petitioners, continued to occupy the land. The bank subsequently filed a petition for a writ of possession to eject them from the property. Procedural History: The Rural Bank of Hinigaran, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of possession in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental. Lumen Baranda, later joined by her sons Julio and Roberto Baranda (the petitioners), opposed this, filing a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) alleging violations of agrarian reform laws and seeking a restraining order. The CAR judge issued a restraining order after a sheriff's report indicated the Barandas were actual tillers of the land. Following the judiciary reorganization, the CAR case was transferred to the RTC. The petitioners also filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and injunction with the Court of Appeals, claiming tenancy rights and exclusive jurisdiction of the CAR. The Court of Appeals dismissed their petition, affirming the RTC's jurisdiction. The Barandas then filed a motion to dismiss the writ of possession petition in the RTC, which was denied. Subsequently, the RTC issued the questioned order granting the writ of possession. Lumen Baranda died during these proceedings. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal but then filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court. The Petition: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the RTC's September 16, 1986 order granting the writ of possession. They argued that the respondent judge acted with abuse of discretion and exceeded his jurisdiction. The Supreme Court considered whether a tenancy relationship existed and whether the RTC had jurisdiction. The Court found that the petitioners failed to establish a de jure tenancy relationship, noting Lumen Baranda's affidavit stating the land was not tenanted, the prior consolidation of ownership by the bank, and the timing of the agrarian case filing relative to the writ of possession petition. The Court also held that certiorari could not be used as a substitute for a lapsed remedy of appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a writ of possession. Whether the petitioners are entitled to security of tenure as tenants.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The respondent judge did not err nor abuse his discretion in ordering the issuance of a writ of possession.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a writ of possession: The Court held that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power, which was not demonstrated in this case. Several factors supported this conclusion: (1) Lumen Baranda executed an affidavit stating the parcels of land were not tenanted and had no tenancy obligations; (2) ownership of the parcels of land had already been consolidated in the respondent Bank; (3) the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed in January 1982, while the CAR case was filed eight months later in September 1982, indicating the claim of tenancy appeared to be an afterthought; and (4) it is a well-settled rule that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of mortgaged property is entitled to a writ of possession, and it is ministerial upon the court to issue such a writ upon an ex-parte petition of the purchaser, as established in Barican vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Therefore, the respondent judge did not err in holding that the claim of tenancy was an afterthought. On the issue of whether the petitioners are entitled to security of tenure as tenants: The Court found that no tenancy relation existed between the petitioners and the respondent BANK, and thus, the petitioners were not entitled to security of tenure. The essential requisites for a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. The absence of any one of these requisites prevents an occupant or cultivator from being considered a de jure tenant. In this case, the relationship between the petitioners and the respondent BANK was that of mortgagor and mortgagee, not landowner and tenant. Even if the petitioners were actual tillers since 1972, they were tillers as owners, not as tenants, especially considering their mother's affidavit to the contrary. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for a lapsed remedy of appeal, noting that the petitioners filed the instant petition after the reglementary period for appeal had expired.
Main Doctrine
A purchaser in a foreclosure sale of mortgaged property is entitled to a writ of possession, and it is ministerial upon the court to issue such writ upon an ex-parte petition of the purchaser. The claim of tenancy, if raised after the ownership has been consolidated in the bank and after a petition for a writ of possession has been filed, may be considered an afterthought to oppose the issuance of the writ.