South City Homes, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The core dispute concerns a 613-square-meter strip of land, identified as Lot No. 5005 of the Biñan Estate, situated in Calabuso, Biñan, Laguna. This land lies between two larger lots, Lot No. 2381 and Lot No. 2386-A, both owned by petitioner South City Homes, Inc. The petitioner claims ownership of this strip, asserting it was either omitted from the original surveys of the adjacent lots due to inaccuracies or acquired through acquisitive prescription by itself and its predecessors-in-interest over more than forty years. The Republic of the Philippines contends that the strip was originally a canal and thus part of the public domain, unappropriable by private entities, and that the technical descriptions of the adjacent lots do not include it. The Republic also disputes the claim of acquisitive prescription due to insufficient possession. Procedural History: The petitioner initially sought registration of Lot No. 5005 under the Property Registration Law, which was granted by the trial court in 1984. However, this decision was reversed on appeal by a special division of the Court of Appeals, with two justices dissenting. The petitioner, South City Homes, Inc., then brought the case before the Supreme Court, arguing that the appellate court's reversal was erroneous. The Petition: South City Homes, Inc. petitions this Court for review, primarily arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's decision. The petitioner posits two main grounds for its claim: first, that Lot No. 5005 was an omitted portion of its adjacent Lots 2381 and 2386-A due to survey inaccuracies, and second, that it acquired the property by acquisitive prescription through continuous, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owner, along with its predecessors-in-interest, for over forty years. The petitioner seeks to tack the possession of its predecessors to establish the required prescriptive period. The Republic maintains that the land was a canal and public domain, and that the petitioner's evidence of possession is insufficient in both duration and nature to establish prescriptive title.
Issue(s)
Whether Lot No. 5005 should be registered in the name of the petitioner. Whether the petitioner acquired Lot No. 5005 by acquisitive prescription.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the order of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's decision is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether Lot No. 5005 should be registered in the name of the petitioner: The Court found that the technical descriptions of Lots 2381 and 2386-A did not include the strip of land now identified as Lot No. 5005. The petitioner's argument that the old surveys were inaccurate and that the strip was omitted was countered by the fact that the strip was not included even in the original survey where the two lots were stated to adjoin each other. The Court also noted that the petitioner itself suggested the canal, which allegedly occupied the strip, had disappeared and been filled, resulting in a separate lot. The Republic argued that the strip was a canal and thus could not be appropriated. While the Court disagreed that a dried-up canal remains a canal perpetually, it found that the petitioner's claim that the lot was part of the other two lots was contradicted by their technical descriptions. Therefore, the claim that Lot No. 5005 was an omitted part of the adjacent lots was rejected. On the issue of whether the petitioner acquired Lot No. 5005 by acquisitive prescription: The Court found the petitioner's evidence of possession insufficient to establish acquisitive prescription. The testimonies of its witnesses, Rogelio Constantino and Meliton Casunuran, were deemed hearsay and inadequate. Constantino's testimony that the strip was believed to be part of the adjacent lots and had been cultivated as such since the time of predecessors-in-interest was considered self-serving. Casunuran's testimony, also largely hearsay, claimed that predecessors told him the strip was considered part of their lots and was cultivated. However, the Court highlighted that the possession claimed was not exclusive but shared by the predecessors-in-interest. More importantly, the Court ruled that tacking of possession was not permissible in this case. The petitioner acquired Lot 2381 by assignment and Lot 2386-A by purchase, but these deeds did not include Lot No. 5005. Article 1138 of the Civil Code allows tacking only when there is privity of contract or relationship between possessors. Since Lot No. 5005 was not included in the deeds conveying Lots 2381 and 2386-A, there was no privity of contract regarding Lot No. 5005 between the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. Consequently, the petitioner's possession of Lot No. 5005 could only be counted from when it actually began, which was in 1981 when it acquired the adjacent lots and occupied the disputed strip, believing it to be part of them. As the application for registration was filed in 1983, the possession was less than three years, far short of the ten or thirty-year prescriptive period required for immovable property. The Court also noted that the tax declaration for Lot No. 5005 was made only in 1980, further weakening the claim of long-standing possession.
Main Doctrine
Tacking of possession for acquisitive prescription is only allowed when there is privity of contract or relationship between the previous and present possessors. A deed does not create privity as to land outside its calls, and possession of land not described in the deed cannot be tacked onto the possession of the grantor.