Guariña, In re
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Mario Guariña applied for admission to the bar without examination, citing his position as provincial fiscal for Batanes, pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 1597. Procedural History: The applicant had previously taken and failed the bar examination in March 1907, scoring 71% when 75% was required. The Supreme Court reviewed his application for admission based on his holding the office of provincial fiscal. The Petition: The applicant contended that the phrase "may be licensed" in Act No. 1597 should be construed as mandatory ("shall be licensed") to give effect to the legislator's apparent intention and his claim de jure to admission.
Issue(s)
Whether the word "may" in Section 2 of Act No. 1597 should be construed as mandatory ("shall") or permissive ("may") in the context of admitting individuals to the bar without examination. Whether the Supreme Court's inherent power to ascertain the qualifications of bar applicants, as confirmed by Acts of Congress, can be limited or divested by an Act of the Philippine Commission. Whether the applicant, Mario Guariña, possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability for admission to the bar, despite his previous failure in the bar examination and his holding the office of provincial fiscal.
Ruling
The application for license to practice law in the Philippines is denied. However, the Court offers the applicant the opportunity to take a special examination.
Ratio Decidendi
On the construction of "may" as mandatory or permissive: The Court acknowledged that under local statutory construction, "may" can be read as "shall" when necessary to give effect to the legislator's intention, citing Rock Island County Supervisors v. United States. However, this principle is subordinate to the supremacy of Acts of Congress. The Court found that construing "may" as mandatory in Act No. 1597 would conflict with the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which preserved the Court's power to pass upon the "moral character" and "qualifications and ability" of all candidates for admission to the bar. Therefore, to avoid unconstitutionality, "may" must be given its permissive effect, leaving the admission to the discretion of the Court. On the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and the validity of the Commission's Act: The Court held that any Act of the Philippine Commission that conflicts with or is repugnant to an Act of Congress is void and of no effect. The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, confirmed the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, including its power to examine candidates for admission to the bar. Act No. 190, in force at the time, vested the Court with the power to deny admission unless candidates satisfied it of their necessary learning and ability, typically through examination. Therefore, the Commission, while authorized to modify the examination procedure, could not divest the Court of its power to deny admission to unqualified candidates. On the applicant's qualifications: While acknowledging that holding certain public offices mentioned in Act No. 1597 is generally presumed to indicate sufficient qualifications, this presumption is rebuttable. In this case, it affirmatively appeared that the applicant had never been a practicing attorney prior to his appointment as provincial fiscal and had previously failed the bar examination, falling short of the required percentage. The Court concluded that his appointment alone was not satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability, especially in light of his prior deficiency. However, considering his previous near-passing score and his subsequent service as governor and provincial fiscal, the Court offered him the option to take a special examination.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court retains discretion to deny admission to the bar even for individuals holding positions exempted from examination under Act No. 1597, if they fail to demonstrate the necessary qualifications of learning and ability, as the Court's inherent power to ensure the competence of its members, confirmed by Acts of Congress, cannot be divested by local legislation.