Joson III v. Nario
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The incumbent Governor of Nueva Ecija, Eduardo L. Joson, took an indefinite sick leave on December 7, 1989, leading Vice-Governor Narciso S. Nario to assume as Acting Governor. Shortly thereafter, Nario executed a waiver of his right to assume the position of Acting Governor in favor of Senior Board Member Tomas N. Joson III, who then took his oath as Acting Governor on December 19, 1989. Four days later, on December 22, 1989, Nario sent a letter to the Secretary of Local Governments tendering his resignation as Vice-Governor due to poor health, effective after office hours that day. The following day, December 23, 1989, Tomas N. Joson III took his oath as Vice-Governor. On December 26, 1989, Joson III forwarded Nario's resignation to the Secretary of Local Governments, advising of his assumption of the Vice-Governor position. Subsequently, Nario, after further medical examination revealed his illness was not serious, wrote to the Secretary of Local Governments on January 2, 1990, withdrawing his resignation as Vice-Governor and his waiver as Acting Governor, requesting they be considered without legal force. On January 3, 1990, the Secretary of Local Governments informed Nario that he was considered the Vice-Governor and designated him as Acting Provincial Governor due to the temporary incapacity of Governor Eduardo Joson. Nario then took his oath as Acting Provincial Governor. The Secretary of Local Governments directed petitioner Joson III to cease and desist from discharging the powers of the Provincial Governor. Procedural History: Petitioner Tomas N. Joson III filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City on January 4, 1990. The RTC issued a status quo order. After hearing, the RTC, on January 15, 1990, dismissed Joson III's petition and lifted the restraining order, ruling that acceptance is necessary for resignation of public office to be operative and effective, and that Joson III had deviated from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Petition: Joson III filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, praying for the reversal of the RTC decision, declaration of Nario's withdrawal of resignation as illegal, affirmation of Joson III's assumption of office, and nullification of Nario's designation as Acting Governor.
Issue(s)
Whether the office of Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija became vacant upon the voluntary resignation of Narciso S. Nario, and whether his subsequent assumption of the Acting Governor position was lawful. Whether the resignation of Vice-Governor Nario was effective without acceptance by the proper authority, and whether Nario's withdrawal of his resignation was legally valid. Whether petitioner Joson III had exhausted administrative remedies before filing his petition.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, holding that the resignation of a public officer is not effective until accepted by the proper authority, and until then, the officer remains in office. Consequently, Nario's resignation was not effective, his withdrawal was valid, and his assumption of the Acting Governor position was lawful.
Ratio Decidendi
On the effectiveness of resignation and withdrawal: The Court reiterated the established doctrine that, apart from legal provision, mere presentation of a resignation does not create a vacancy. Acceptance by the proper authority is necessary for a resignation to be operative and effective. Until acceptance, the tender of resignation is revocable. This principle is rooted in public policy, as public officers are expected to serve the public interest and cannot simply abandon their duties at will. The Revised Penal Code penalizes abandonment of office before acceptance of resignation. In this case, Nario's resignation as Vice-Governor was not accepted by the Secretary of Local Governments. Therefore, he remained in office and was legally entitled to withdraw his resignation. His subsequent assumption of the Acting Governor position was also lawful as he never lost his position as Vice-Governor. On the effectiveness of resignation and withdrawal: The Court reiterated the established doctrine that, apart from legal provision, mere presentation of a resignation does not create a vacancy. Acceptance by the proper authority is necessary for a resignation to be operative and effective. Until acceptance, the tender of resignation is revocable. This principle is rooted in public policy, as public officers are expected to serve the public interest and cannot simply abandon their duties at will. The Revised Penal Code penalizes abandonment of office before acceptance of resignation. In this case, Nario's resignation as Vice-Governor was not accepted by the Secretary of Local Governments. Therefore, he remained in office and was legally entitled to withdraw his resignation. His subsequent assumption of the Acting Governor position was also lawful as he never lost his position as Vice-Governor. On the exhaustion of administrative remedies: The Court affirmed the RTC's finding that petitioner Joson III had deviated from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The issue of whether Nario's resignation was effective and whether Joson III should assume office was primarily an administrative matter falling under the purview of the Secretary of Local Governments. Resorting to the courts before exhausting administrative remedies renders the action premature, unless exceptions apply. The Court found no compelling reason to deviate from this rule in this case, as the administrative process was still ongoing and the Secretary of Local Governments had acted on the matter.
Main Doctrine
The resignation of a public officer is not effective until accepted by the proper authority. Until acceptance, the officer remains in office and may be compelled to perform duties, and abandonment before acceptance is punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The effectiveness of a resignation depends on acceptance, not solely on the terms stated by the officer.