Mamadsual v. Moson
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners-spouses filed a complaint with the Shari'a District Court for Quieting of Title to Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-138, and Damages, with an application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against private respondents. Petitioners claimed actual, continuous, and adverse possession of the land in question since time immemorial. Procedural History: After a pre-trial conference, the Shari'a District Court directed parties to submit statements (shudhud) and other evidence (bayyina). Petitioners complied, but private respondents failed to do so. The case was set for trial but was postponed multiple times. Private respondents later filed a pleading designated as "Amplification of Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint On the Ground of Lack of Jurisdiction." The trial court, on November 7, 1989, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action, ruling that petitioners had no legal or equitable title and were not the proper parties to annul the certificates of title, and that the action had prescribed. The Petition: Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court on January 29, 1990. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint, in ruling it had no jurisdiction, and in ruling it had no cause of action.
Issue(s)
Whether the Shari'a District Court erred in considering the private respondents' pleading, which was in effect a motion to dismiss, despite its prohibition under Section 13 of the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a. Whether the Shari'a District Court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to hear the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs were not the proper parties to bring the action and/or the action had prescribed. Whether the Shari'a District Court erred in ruling that the complaint had no cause of action on the ground that the plaintiffs had no legal or equitable title to the land in question.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the trial court dated November 7, 1989 and January 23, 1990 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the records of the case are REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the motion to dismiss: The Court held that while Section 13 of the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a proscribes the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, Section 16 of the same law provides that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner. Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allows grounds for dismissal to be pleaded as affirmative defenses, with a preliminary hearing thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. Therefore, the trial court properly set the case for hearing on the affirmative defenses seeking dismissal, as the prohibition is aimed at dilatory pleadings that would stop the running of the period to file an answer. On jurisdiction, proper parties, and prescription: The Court disagreed with the trial court's dismissal. It found that the complaint was an action for quieting of title, and that an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. The Court cited Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana to support the rule that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible, as the owner in fee continues to have a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of any adverse claim. The petitioners alleged they were in actual, continuous, and adverse possession since time immemorial, and that their possession was recently disturbed by private respondents constructing dikes, thus entitling them to vindicate their right. On cause of action and title: The trial court erred in ruling that petitioners had no legal or equitable title and thus no cause of action. The Court clarified that it is not necessary for the person seeking to quiet title to be the registered owner. "Title" can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner. The Court referenced Chacon where an action for quieting of title was considered even with allegations of ownership and possession since time immemorial, despite defendants securing a certificate of title through fraud. An equitable right or interest is sufficient to file an action to quiet title. Since petitioners claimed title by prescription, the property was effectively withdrawn from the public domain and became private property, negating the trial court's conclusion that the action was solely for reversion and thus only the Solicitor General could institute it.
Main Doctrine
An action to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible, and the plaintiff need not have registered legal title or equitable title, but only an interest in the property.