Dagupan Bus Company, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Leonito T. Marasigan, a bus driver for Dagupan Bus Company, Inc. since 1981, was prevented from working in September 1986 due to repairs on his assigned bus. Upon attempting to return to work, he was repeatedly told the repairs were ongoing or that the bus was being used by another company due to a strike. After the strike ended, he was advised to return later. When he continued to report for work, he was told to go on vacation and eventually realized he had been dismissed. More than a year later, Marasigan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, seeking payment of salary differentials, 13th month pay, sick leave, and other benefits. Procedural History: The petitioner, Dagupan Bus Company, Inc., contended that Marasigan had abandoned his position for fourteen months and was dropped from the rolls for unauthorized absences, having been duly informed of his termination. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Marasigan but awarded separation pay instead of reinstatement due to strained relations, disallowing other claims except for attorney's fees. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed this decision in its entirety. The petitioner is now before the Supreme Court, faulting the NLRC for grave abuse of discretion. The Petition: The petitioner seeks review of the NLRC's decision, primarily arguing that the findings of fact by the lower bodies were arbitrary and lacked basis. The petitioner claims Marasigan abandoned his employment and was subsequently dismissed for unauthorized absences, asserting that notices to return to work were sent and ignored. The petitioner also suggests Marasigan may have left to work abroad. The Supreme Court, however, finds no merit in the petition, emphasizing that it is not a trier of facts and defers to the lower bodies' findings absent established exceptions. The Court concludes that Marasigan did not abandon his employment and that the petitioner's actions lacked candor.
Issue(s)
Whether the National Labor Relations Commission erred in finding that private respondent did not abandon his employment. Whether mere absence, including prolonged absence, is sufficient to constitute abandonment of employment. Whether the award of separation pay instead of reinstatement was proper in view of the strained relations between the parties. Whether the petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion warranting reversal by the Court.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's factual findings that Marasigan did not abandon his employment and affirmed the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Costs are imposed against the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the NLRC erred in finding no abandonment: The Court deferred to the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter on factual findings, noting that this Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb such findings absent established exceptions. The record showed that private respondent repeatedly sought to resume work and was repeatedly given vague promises and temporizing responses by petitioner, conduct inconsistent with an intention to abandon. The Court quoted the Labor Arbiter's correct statement that abandonment "cannot just be shown by mere absence" and that it "requires a deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in terms of specific circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for work." The Court relied on analogous NLRC precedents, including Policarpio v. Vicente Dysun Jr. and Mario Franco v. E & M Security Agency, to underscore that prolonged absence alone does not establish abandonment. Consequently, the Court held that there was substantial basis for the NLRC's finding that Marasigan did not abandon his employment. On Whether mere absence is sufficient to constitute abandonment: The Court reiterated the legal standard that mere absence, even if prolonged, does not automatically equate to abandonment; there must be both intention and an overt act. The Labor Arbiter's explanation, adopted by the NLRC and the Court, emphasized the need for a "concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act" from which such intention may be inferred. Applying the cited NLRC decisions, the Court observed that Marasigan's conduct—repeated attempts to report for work and pursuit of a complaint for unjust dismissal shortly thereafter—negated any inference of an intention to abandon. The Court also addressed petitioner's claim that notices were sent but found the evidence showed notices were mailed to an old address despite knowledge of the employee's new address, undermining petitioner's position. For these reasons, the Court maintained that absence without proof of intent and overt acts is insufficient to establish abandonment. On Whether separation pay in lieu of reinstatement was proper: The Court upheld the Labor Arbiter's exercise of discretion in awarding separation pay instead of reinstatement due to strained relations between the employee and management. The Court recognized that reinstatement is the norm in illegal dismissal cases but that the remedy may be adjusted when circumstances, such as antagonistic relations, make reinstatement impracticable. The record supported the Labor Arbiter's and NLRC's assessment of strained relations and the Court found no reason to disturb that discretionary determination. Therefore, the award of separation pay was sustained as an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. On Whether there was grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC or the Labor Arbiter. Given the factual findings supported by the record—especially the employee's repeated attempts to return and the employer's evasive responses—the Court concluded that the lower bodies acted within their authority and discretion. Absent any showing of arbitrariness or lack of basis in the findings, the Supreme Court declined to interfere, noting the constitutional mandate to protect labor and the limited role of the Court in revising factual determinations.
Main Doctrine
Abandonment of employment requires a concurrence of the intention to abandon and an overt act from which such intention may be inferred; mere absence, even if prolonged, is insufficient to establish abandonment.