Pacete v. The Honorable Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Elias V. Pacete was appointed City Attorney of General Santos City on July 22, 1968. The incumbent Mayor, Antonio C. Acharon, was charged with murder and detained. Pending the case, Mayor Acharon was reelected and issued administrative orders regarding the acting mayoralty. The Supreme Court, in previous cases (G.R. No. 35303 and G.R. No. L-33835), affirmed the authority of Vice-Mayor Erlindo Grafilo to act as Mayor due to Mayor Acharon's detention. Procedural History: Acting Mayor Grafilo suspended petitioner Pacete for ten days effective July 11, 1972, and subsequently removed him as City Attorney on July 20, 1972, citing loss of confidence, purportedly stemming from Pacete's legal opinion questioning Grafilo's authority. Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which directed his reinstatement pending resolution. Acting Mayor Grafilo disregarded this directive and appointed a new City Attorney. Petitioner filed a claim for back salaries with the City Treasurer, which was forwarded to the Auditor General and then to the Office of the President for opinion. The Assistant Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, rendered an opinion on February 18, 1974, stating that Pacete's termination was lawful and he was not entitled to back salaries. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The Commission on Audit, taking over the functions of the Auditor General, subsequently disallowed the claim. Petitioner filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking backwages and damages. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition with the Supreme Court praying for payment of backwages from July 11, 1972, until the final termination of his case, and for damages against the City Auditor for refusing to audit his claim. Reinstatement was not prayed for. The case was submitted for decision in 1975 but remained pending until after the 1987 Constitution. The parties were required to move in the premises, and respondents claimed the case was moot due to petitioner's appointment as Hearing Officer IV of the National Police Commission in 1976.
Issue(s)
Whether the Office of the President could review the decision of the Auditor General without violating the separation of powers and non-delegation principles. Whether the failure of the Auditor General to decide the claim within sixty (60) days resulted in the automatic grant of petitioner's claim for backwages. Whether the position of City Attorney is primarily confidential, making loss of confidence a valid ground for termination. Whether petitioner is entitled to backwages and damages.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Office of the President reviewing the Auditor General's decision: The Court held that the Office of the President did not review the ruling of the Auditor General. Instead, the Auditor General referred the petitioner's case to the Office of the President for an opinion, which formed the basis for the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit's decision disallowing the claim. Therefore, the Commission on Audit issued its own separate decision, and it cannot be claimed that it abdicated its authority. The contention that the Office of the President's opinion violated the principles of separation of powers and non-delegation of powers was deemed unmeritorious. On the issue of automatic grant of claim due to the Auditor General's delay: The Court found this contention bereft of merit. Citing Commonwealth Act No. 327, Section 1, which mandates the Auditor General to act and decide claims within sixty days, the Court referred to its ruling in Carabao, Inc. v. Agricultural Productivity Commission. In that case, it was held that the claimant's remedy for the Auditor General's failure to decide within sixty days is to institute mandamus proceedings to compel the rendition of a decision. The lapse of the sixty-day period does not result in the automatic grant of the claim, as this theory cannot be inferred from Commonwealth Act No. 327. On the issue of the City Attorney position being primarily confidential: The Court reiterated its previous rulings in Besa v. Philippine National Bank and Claudio v. Subido, stating that the position of City Legal Officer (or City Attorney) requires the utmost confidence on the part of the Mayor. The relationship between a lawyer and their client, whether public or private, depends on the highest degree of trust. The phrase "primarily confidential" denotes not only confidence in the appointee's aptitude but, more importantly, close intimacy that ensures freedom of intercourse without fear of betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of state. The tenure of officials in such positions ends upon loss of confidence, as their term lasts only as long as confidence endures, and their cessation involves no removal but an expiration of the term. On the entitlement to backwages and damages: Based on the determination that the position of City Attorney is confidential and that termination due to loss of confidence is lawful, the Court ruled that the petitioner is not entitled to the backwages claimed. Consequently, the respondent City Auditor cannot be held liable for damages, as his refusal to audit the claim was in accordance with a lawful order from the Acting Commissioner on Audit. The Court found no cogent reason to depart from its established jurisprudence on the nature of the City Attorney position.
Main Doctrine
The position of City Attorney is considered primarily confidential, and termination based on loss of confidence is a valid ground for separation from service, thus disentitling the official to backwages.