Cardoza v. Singson
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the execution of a 1938 decision, affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals in 1939, regarding the ownership of several parcels of land. The original decision declared the plaintiffs entitled to half of parcels A, B, C, and D, and ordered the administrator to deliver these portions. The Court of Appeals modified this by ordering the delivery of one-half of parcel I to the plaintiffs. The petitioner, Juanito Cardoza, claims ownership of parcels A, B, C, and D based on a will and testament of his aunt, Eulalia Cardoza, and subsequent inheritance. 2. Procedural History: After a significant delay of over 40 years from the Court of Appeals' decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1853 filed a motion for execution in 1979, alleging they only learned of the decision in 1974 due to the death of their counsel and the loss of records during the war. The trial court initially directed parties to submit memoranda. Subsequently, the trial court ordered a nunc pro tunc judgment to be entered based on the Court of Appeals' decision and issued a writ of execution on July 6, 1981. This writ was served on the petitioner and others. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was initially granted, holding the execution in abeyance. However, the trial court later reinstated its order and directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution on October 14, 1981. The sheriff executed the writ on November 11, 1981, delivering the property to the plaintiffs. The petitioner was informed of this turn over and later appeared in court regarding contempt charges for harvesting coconuts from the disputed land. 3. The Petition: Juanito Cardoza filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul the writ of execution and restore possession of the three parcels of land. He argued that the trial court usurped the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by ordering a nunc pro tunc judgment, that the 40-year delay in seeking execution was grounds for denial, and that he was deprived of property without due process. He also asserted his ownership based on inheritance and alleged an agreement where plaintiffs accepted parcel D instead of half of the four parcels. The Supreme Court issued a resolution enjoining further proceedings and ordering the restoration of possession to the petitioner, requiring respondents to file their comment. The private respondents countered that the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, that execution was still valid under the Code of Civil Procedure, and disputed the petitioner's claims of ownership and possession.
Issue(s)
Whether the decision of the trial court as modified by the Court of Appeals can still be enforced. Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it made the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issued the writ of execution.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the judgment can still be enforced: The Supreme Court held that the judgment of the trial court dated February 7, 1938, as modified by the Court of Appeals on December 6, 1939, can still be enforced. This is based on Section 443, Chapter IX of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure), which states that the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution within five years from the date of its entry. The Court emphasized that the counting of the five-year period commences from the entry of judgment, not its promulgation. In this case, there was no record of any entry of judgment in either the appellate court or the lower court, thus the five-year period had not commenced. On whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion: The Court ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in making the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issuing the writ of execution. Acting as a court of law and equity, the trial court correctly ordered the entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc to reflect the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court cited Lichauco v. Tan Pho (51 Phil. 862) to support the validity of nunc pro tunc entries to save proceedings. Furthermore, the petitioner was given the opportunity to oppose the motions and submit a memorandum, which he failed to do, nor did he adduce sufficient evidence to support his claims. The Court reiterated the rule that a final and executory judgment can no longer be amended except for clerical errors, and the trial court loses jurisdiction except to execute the judgment.
Main Doctrine
A trial court may validly issue a nunc pro tunc judgment and writ of execution to enforce a final and executory decision, even after the lapse of considerable time, provided that the counting of the five-year period for execution begins from the entry of judgment, not its promulgation, and there is no record of such entry.