Bulaong v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from two civil cases filed in the Regional Trial Court of Zambales: one for a sum of money filed by petitioner Romulo S. Bulaong against Vicente Vistan, Leonardo Buenaventura, and Conrado Sta. Maria, and another for rescission of contract with damages filed by Vicente Vistan against Bulaong. Subsequently, Bulaong filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Vistan and Buenaventura. In response to this, Bulaong and his counsel, Gil P. de Guzman, submitted a reply-affidavit containing statements that Vistan and Buenaventura alleged to be libelous. This led to the filing of a libel complaint against Bulaong and de Guzman. 2. Procedural History: Following the filing of the libel complaint, an information for libel was filed against petitioners Romulo S. Bulaong and Gil P. de Guzman. The petitioners moved to quash this information, arguing that the facts charged did not constitute an offense and that the fiscal lacked the authority to file it, asserting that the reply-affidavit was absolutely privileged communication. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City denied their motion to quash and subsequently denied their motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, which also dismissed their petition for lack of merit. 3. The Petition: The petitioners are seeking a review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision. They contend that the appellate court erred in failing to recognize that the preliminary investigation proceedings were part of official proceedings and thus subject to absolute privileged communication. Furthermore, they argue that the denial of their petition violated the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court, however, found the petition devoid of merit, reiterating that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not subject to certiorari, and that such defenses should be raised during trial and, if necessary, on appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Whether the alleged libelous statements in the reply-affidavit are covered by the mantle of absolutely privileged communications. Whether the denial of the motion to quash is reviewable by certiorari and prohibition.
Ruling
The petition is denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the denial of the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus: The Court reiterated that certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to quash. The proper procedure is to proceed to trial without prejudice to raising the special defenses invoked in the motion. If an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, the accused may appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses or objections, which would then be subject to review by the appellate court. An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not a final order, thus not appealable nor subject to a petition for certiorari. The accused should have proceeded with the trial and, if judgment was rendered against him, he could then appeal and present the questions sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari. On whether the alleged libelous statements are absolutely privileged communications: The Court held that whether the alleged libelous statements in the reply-affidavit are covered within the mantle of absolutely privileged communications is a defense that petitioners could raise upon the trial on the merits. If that defense should fail, they could still raise the same on appeal. Consequently, the motion to quash the information for libel on the ground of qualified privilege, duly opposed by the prosecution, is properly denied, as the prosecution is entitled to prove at the trial that there was malice in fact on the part of the petitioners. The RTC's denial of the motion to quash was therefore proper, as the prosecution is entitled to present evidence to prove malice. On the denial of the motion to quash and the availability of certiorari and prohibition: The Court reiterated that certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to quash. The proper procedure is to proceed to trial without prejudice to raising the special defenses invoked in the motion. If an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, the accused may appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses or objections, which would then be subject to review by the appellate court. An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not a final order, thus not appealable nor subject to a petition for certiorari. The accused should have proceeded with the trial and, if judgment was rendered against him, he could then appeal and present the questions sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.
Main Doctrine
An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable; the accused should proceed to trial and, if an adverse decision is rendered, may appeal the judgment and raise the defenses invoked in the motion to quash.