Abella v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In the local elections of February 1, 1988, Adelina Y. Larrazabal filed her certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte in substitution of her husband, Emeterio Larrazabal, who was disqualified for lack of residence. Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter, filed a petition to disqualify Adelina, alleging she was a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, not Kananga, Leyte. Despite the pending challenge, Adelina was proclaimed the winner, having obtained the highest number of votes, while Benjamin P. Abella placed second. Procedural History: The disqualification case (SPC No. 88-546) was initially dismissed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) but was remanded by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 88004. Upon remand, the COMELEC Second Division disqualified Adelina on February 14, 1991, finding she lacked the required residence and registration in the province of Leyte. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed this disqualification on July 18, 1991, but also disallowed the proclamation of the second-placer, Abella. The Petition: Adelina filed a petition (G.R. No. 100739) arguing that her residence in Ormoc City did not disqualify her from running for a provincial office in Leyte and that she maintained 'animus revertendi' (intent to return) to Kananga. Simultaneously, Abella filed a petition (G.R. No. 100710) asserting that because Adelina was disqualified, her votes should be considered stray, and he, as the candidate with the next highest number of valid votes, should be proclaimed Governor.
Issue(s)
Whether Adelina Larrazabal met the residence and registration requirements to run for Governor of Leyte. Whether the voters and residents of Ormoc City are eligible to run for provincial elective offices in the Province of Leyte. Whether the decision of the COMELEC Second Division was void because it was signed by a Commissioner whose term had allegedly expired. Whether Benjamin Abella, as the second-placer, is entitled to be proclaimed Governor following the disqualification of the winning candidate.
Ruling
The Supreme Court DISMISSED both petitions and AFFIRMED the COMELEC's decision and resolution. Adelina Larrazabal was declared disqualified, and Benjamin Abella was denied proclamation as Governor.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court ruled that Adelina Larrazabal failed to satisfy the one-year residence requirement in the province of Leyte. Under the Civil Code and Family Code, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence, and spouses are generally obliged to fix a single family domicile. Evidence showed Adelina had established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband since 1975. Her claim of 'animus revertendi' to Kananga was unsupported by evidence of a temporary departure for a specific purpose; rather, her occasional visits were insufficient to maintain legal residence. Furthermore, her attempt to register as a voter in Kananga was marred by 'bizarre circumstances' and irregularities in the election records, leading the Court to uphold the COMELEC's finding that she was not a bona fide registered voter of Kananga. On Issue 2: The Court held that Ormoc City is an independent component city because its charter (Republic Act No. 179) prohibits its voters from voting for provincial officials. Under Article X, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, cities whose charters contain such a prohibition are independent of the province. This independence signifies that the city is outside the supervisory power of the province and its residents are disqualified from both voting for and being elected to provincial offices. The Court interpreted the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote' in the Ormoc Charter as encompassing a prohibition against both running for and voting in provincial elections. To hold otherwise would allow residents of a city that is not part of the provincial electorate to govern the province. On Issue 3: The Court found no merit in the argument that Commissioner Flores' participation rendered the decision void. Even assuming his term had expired, he acted as a 'de facto' officer under color of a known appointment and exercised his duties for three years. The 'de facto' doctrine protects the validity of official acts performed by a person who occupies a public office with a reputation of being the officer they assume to be. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's affirmation of the En Banc resolution, which was promulgated when the Commission was fully and validly constituted, cured any alleged procedural defect in the division's decision. On Issue 4: The Court reiterated the 'Second-Placer Rule' from Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections. It held that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner because they were not the choice of the majority or plurality of the electorate. Proclaiming a runner-up would be repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage. Since the voters cast their ballots for Adelina in the sincere belief that she was qualified, those votes cannot be treated as stray or void. Consequently, the disqualification of the winner creates a permanent vacancy to be filled by the Vice-Governor according to the rules of succession, rather than by the second-placer.
Main Doctrine
A candidate for a provincial elective office must be a resident and a registered voter of the province where they seek election. In the case of component cities, if the city charter prohibits its voters from participating in provincial elections, the city is considered independent of the province for election purposes. Consequently, a registered voter of such an independent component city is ineligible to run for a provincial office. Moreover, the 'Second-Placer Rule' dictates that the runner-up in an election cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified, as the runner-up failed to secure the plurality of the legal votes cast, and the votes for the disqualified winner are not considered 'stray' if the electorate believed the candidate was eligible at the time of voting.