Lusterio v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Office of Supply Officer III in the Division of Quezon became vacant upon the retirement of Epifanio Pareno on April 7, 1977. Serafin Palomar was appointed to the position on December 5, 1977, effective April 11, 1977, but subject to the outcome of a protest filed by Jose Lusterio. Palomar assumed office on April 11, 1977. Procedural History: Jose Lusterio protested Palomar's appointment. The Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) denied Lusterio's protest on September 19, 1977. Lusterio's motion for reconsideration and subsequent appeal to the Office of the President were also denied. However, the Civil Service Commission's Merit System Board, in Resolution No. 6 dated September 5, 1978, recommended the rescission of Palomar's appointment and the appointment of Lusterio, finding Lusterio to be next in rank and qualified. The Office of the President, on May 8, 1979, rendered a decision rescinding Palomar's appointment in favor of Lusterio. Palomar's motion for reconsideration was dismissed on June 26, 1979. Lusterio assumed office on June 7, 1979. Palomar initiated the present action, and the Regional Trial Court declared Palomar's appointment valid and Lusterio's appointment null and void, finding that Lusterio's appointment was made with grave abuse of discretion. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the RTC's decision. The Petition: Petitioner Jose Lusterio seeks to set aside the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, arguing that he is more qualified and entitled to the position, and that the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President was not an encroachment on the appointing authority's discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in rescinding the appointment of Serafin Palomar and directing the appointment of Jose Lusterio. Whether Serafin Palomar met the minimum requirements for the position of Supply Officer III. Whether Jose Lusterio met the minimum requirements for the position of Supply Officer III. Whether the interpretation of "next-in-rank" by the lower courts was correct.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is affirmed. The appointment of Serafin Palomar as Supply Officer III is declared valid and effective, and the appointment of Jose Lusterio is declared null and void.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Power of Appointment and Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court reiterated the well-entrenched doctrine that the power of appointment is essentially discretionary and vested in the head of the office concerned. The Civil Service Commission's authority is limited to ascertaining if the appointee possesses the required qualifications; it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority. The Court found that the Merit Systems Board, the Civil Service Commission, and the Office of the President committed an error, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, when they rescinded Palomar's appointment and directed the appointment of Lusterio. Their authorized action, if they were convinced otherwise, was merely to disapprove Palomar's appointment, not to encroach on the appointing authority's discretion to appoint another qualified individual. This action was analogous to a situation where the Commission finds multiple aspirants qualified and then directs the appointment of one, which constitutes an encroachment on the appointing authority's prerogative. On Serafin Palomar's Qualifications: The Court affirmed the findings of the lower courts that Serafin Palomar met all the requirements for the position of Supply Officer III. He was a Supervising Fiscal Clerk, and his functions covered an aspect of supply activities, specifically the fiscal requirements of supplies and materials for the division office. He also completed in-service courses in supply and property management. The Court found that his experience as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk, coupled with his training, satisfied the experience requirement for the contested position. On Jose Lusterio's Qualifications: While the Court acknowledged that Lusterio might also be qualified, it emphasized that even if he were, the appointing authority had the discretion to choose between qualified candidates. The Court did not definitively rule on Lusterio's qualifications but focused on the limitations of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President in overriding the appointing authority's choice. On the Interpretation of "Next-in-Rank": The Court agreed with the petitioner that it was an error for the courts below to restrictively limit the concept of "next-in-rank" to the immediate organizational unit where the vacancy occurs (the division office). However, even if Lusterio occupied a next-in-rank position, this fact alone did not make it mandatory for the appointing power to appoint him. Section 19(3) of P.D. No. 807 (The Civil Service Decree) provides that next-in-rank employees "shall be considered for promotion," not "shall be promoted." The Court clarified that this section means they shall be among the first to be considered, and the appointing power retains discretion. Furthermore, the Court noted that Section 4 of Rule V of the Civil Service Rules, which mandated promotion for qualified next-in-rank employees, was promulgated beyond the Commission's statutory authority and had been superseded by subsequent resolutions consistent with the Civil Service Decree.
Main Doctrine
The power of appointment is essentially discretionary and vested in the head of the office concerned. The Civil Service Commission's authority is limited to ascertaining if the appointee possesses the required qualifications; it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority by directing the appointment of its own choice or by reviewing the wisdom of the selection from among qualified candidates.