Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, against respondent Rufino de Guzman, seeking the annulment of two deeds of sale involving a riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Petitioner also prayed for the surrender of the produce and damages due to the respondent's refusal to have the deeds set aside. Procedural History: Before summons could be served on the respondent, the RTC Executive Judge, after a conference with petitioner's counsel, dismissed the complaint motu proprio on the ground of improper venue. The RTC found the action to be a real action concerning property located outside its territorial jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) affirmed this dismissal. The Petition: Petitioner argued that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's finding of improper venue, asserting that only the defendant can question venue and that the court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio on this ground as venue is waivable.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue. Whether the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue, without the defendant having raised the issue, is proper.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is nullified and set aside. The complaint filed by petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch LXXI, is revived and reinstated, and the respondent court is enjoined to proceed in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue: The Supreme Court held that the motu proprio dismissal of a complaint on the ground of improper venue is plain error, attributable to the confusion between jurisdiction and venue. Venue relates to the locality where the suit may be had and is primarily for the convenience of the parties, whereas jurisdiction is the power of the court to decide a case on its merits. Provisions on venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, not between the court and the subject matter. Therefore, venue is procedural and not substantive, and it can be waived by the parties, particularly the defendant. On the issue of whether the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue, without the defendant having raised the issue, is proper: The Court emphasized that questions relating to venue are governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. Even if the action were considered a real action, the Regional Trial Court would still have jurisdiction over it, as RTCs are vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property. The crucial point is that venue may be waived expressly or impliedly. Unless the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be considered improperly laid, as it may be acceptable to the parties. The trial court cannot preempt the defendant's prerogative to object to improper venue by dismissing the case motu proprio. At this stage, the trial court should have required the petitioner to exhaust alternative modes of service of summons if the defendant had not yet been served or appeared. Dismissing the complaint prematurely on the ground of improper venue, without allowing the procedural course to take its proper path, is a procedural shortcut that denies both parties their right to be heard.
Main Doctrine
A trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue; venue is a matter that can be waived by the defendant and cannot be objected to by the court without the defendant's challenge.