Viray v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a written lease agreement for residential premises at Apartment A, 1836 Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The lease, executed on April 1, 1981, was between owner Benjamin de Asis and lessee Rustico Victor. The agreement stipulated a three-month term, renewable monthly, and granted the lessor the right to repossess the premises upon the lessee's failure to comply with lease terms, following a five-day written notice or posting of notice if the lessee was absent. The lessee, Victor, and his wife left for Canada in October 1983 and returned in February 1985. Despite their return, Victor did not personally re-occupy the apartment, leaving it in the care of his sons. De Asis initiated an eviction suit in December 1984 due to perceived abandonment, but it was dismissed upon the Victors' return. Later, in December 1985, De Asis discovered the apartment was unoccupied but locked, leading him to cut off utilities and post a termination notice. Procedural History: Following the termination notice and a subsequent repossession notice posted by De Asis, he, in the presence of barangay authorities, entered the apartment on January 5, 1986, inventoried the contents, made repairs, and leased it to Cresencio Viray. Subsequently, Roldan Victor, on behalf of his father Rustico, filed a forcible entry case against De Asis and Viray in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC). The MTC ruled in favor of the Victors, ordering the restoration of possession and declaring the repossession stipulation void as against public policy. De Asis and Viray appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MTC decision. Their subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) was also dismissed, upholding the lower courts' rulings. The Petition: De Asis and Viray filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the adverse decisions of the lower courts. They raise two primary questions of law: (a) whether the posting of the lease termination notice in December 1985 legally extinguished the lease as of December 31, 1985, and (b) whether De Asis possessed the legal and contractual right to repossess the premises without prior judicial authority. The petitioners argue that the lease was validly terminated by notice and that the stipulation allowing extrajudicial repossession, similar to provisions upheld in prior Supreme Court cases, is valid and not contrary to public policy. They contend that the lessee's failure to comply with lease terms and subsequent abandonment justified the lessor's actions.
Issue(s)
Whether the posting of the notice of termination of the lease in December 1985 legally caused its cessation or extinguishment as of December 31, 1985. Whether Benjamin de Asis had the legal and contractual right to repossess the premises without and independently of prior judicial authority.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and another is rendered dismissing the forcible entry case.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue (legality of lease termination): The Supreme Court held that the month-to-month lease was validly terminated by the lessor through a written notice. The lease agreement stipulated that it was for a period of three months and was implicitly renewable from month to month unless revised in writing. Established doctrine construes such leases as providing a definite period and terminable by notice at the end of any given month. The lessor posted a notice of termination at the doorway of the leased apartment, which was authorized by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court for demands made by a landlord when no persons are found on the premises. The lessee's representative removed the notice, but this did not invalidate the termination process. Therefore, the lease was licitly terminated by the notice. On the second issue (right to repossess without judicial authority): The Supreme Court ruled that the stipulation in the lease contract empowering the lessor to repossess the apartment extrajudicially upon the lessee's failure to comply with terms and conditions was valid. The Court cited its earlier ruling in Consing v. Jamandre, which upheld a similar stipulation as being in the nature of a resolutory condition, not illegal, and not requiring court intervention if agreed upon by the parties. The Court also noted American jurisprudence supporting the validity of such clauses, allowing reasonable force for re-entry upon termination of the lease. Furthermore, the Court invoked the principle that the existence of an affirmative right of action on the part of the landlord to oust the tenant is fatal to any action by the tenant to recover possession after being ousted otherwise than judicially, preventing circuity of action as established in Apundar v. Andrin and Medel v. Militante. Since the lessor had a valid right to terminate the lease and repossess the premises, the lessee's action for forcible entry was without merit.
Main Doctrine
A stipulation in a lease agreement granting the lessor the right to extrajudicially repossess the premises upon the lessee's failure to comply with the terms and conditions, including abandonment, is valid and not contrary to public policy, provided that the lessor follows the agreed procedure for notice and repossession, and the termination of the lease is licit.