People v. Clamor
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On March 27, 1981, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Ricardo Rivera and his companion Jaime Pascual were walking along Deparo, Caloocan City. A motorcycle with two riders passed by, and the person in the rear shot Ricardo Rivera. The motorcycle then turned back, and the rear rider shot Ricardo Rivera again, hitting him in the back. Ricardo Rivera was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital. Procedural History: The Information charged Gregorio Clamor and John Doe with murder, alleging treachery and evident premeditation. Appellant Clamor pleaded not guilty. The case against John Doe was archived. The Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City found Gregorio Clamor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The trial court considered the victim's ante mortem statement as a dying declaration and gave credence to the testimonies of witnesses Inocencio Arellano and Eulogio Rivera. The Petition: Gregorio Clamor appealed the decision, assigning as errors the appreciation of the dying declaration and the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court also considered the defense of alibi and the effect of affidavits of retraction executed by prosecution witnesses.
Issue(s)
Whether the ante mortem statement of the deceased Ricardo Rivera qualifies as a dying declaration. Whether the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Inocencio Arellano and Eulogio Rivera are credible. Whether the defense of alibi presented by the appellant is sufficient to overcome the prosecution's evidence. Whether the affidavits of retraction executed by prosecution witnesses warrant a new trial or acquittal. Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were properly appreciated. Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be credited to the appellant.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court. While affirming the conviction for murder, the Court credited the appellant with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The sentence was modified to an indeterminate period ranging from twelve (12) years as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum. The indemnity for moral damages was set at P50,000.00 and actual damages at P12,700.00.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of the ante mortem statement as a dying declaration: The Court held that the ante mortem statement of Ricardo Rivera was admissible as a dying declaration. The victim, when asked if he believed his wounds were mortal, answered, "Sa palagay ko po." This indicated his consciousness of impending death. The statement concerned the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death, and the victim was competent to testify. The Court also noted that the statement was taken in the regular course of official police business, creating a presumption of correctness regarding the time it was made (8:45 p.m.). The Court found that the elements of a dying declaration were present, including the declaration concerning the cause and circumstances of death, the declarant's consciousness of impending death, the declarant's competency, and the offer in a criminal case where death is the subject of inquiry. The statement was also considered part of the res gestae. On the credibility of prosecution witnesses: The Court gave credence to the testimonies of Inocencio Arellano and Eulogio Rivera. Arellano positively identified appellant Gregorio Clamor as the gunman. Eulogio Rivera, the victim's brother, also positively identified Clamor as the person on the back seat of the motorcycle who shot the victim. The Court found their testimonies to be forthright, clear, and positive, and noted that Arellano's testimony was maintained throughout cross-examination. The trial court's reliance on these testimonies was deemed proper. On the defense of alibi: The Court rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. The Court found that the defense of alibi could not overcome the victim's dying declaration and the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which consistently pointed to the appellant as the perpetrator. Furthermore, the appellant had not sufficiently demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to be in Caloocan City at the time of the incident, especially considering the available public transportation and the estimated travel time. The Court emphasized that alibi requires proof of physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. On the affidavits of retraction: The Court gave no effect to the affidavits of retraction executed by prosecution witnesses Gregorio Rivera and Inocencio Arellano. The Court reiterated the well-settled rule that it looks with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously given in court, as such affidavits can easily be secured for monetary consideration and are considered exceedingly unreliable. The Court found Arellano's retraction to be a simple, blanket denial that did not warrant rejection of his detailed and forthright testimony given during trial. The Court also noted that the trial court's decision did not rest exclusively on Arellano's testimony, but was corroborated by the dying declaration and Eulogio Rivera's identification. On the aggravating circumstances: The Court correctly appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance. The appellant, armed with a gun and riding tandem on a motorcycle, suddenly and without warning shot Ricardo Rivera in the back as the motorcycle sped by. The victim was walking unsuspecting and unarmed, and had no effective opportunity to defend himself. However, the Court found that evident premeditation was not sufficiently proven, as none of its elements were established by the prosecution. The Court also erroneously appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance, as nocturnity is generally absorbed in treachery. On the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender: The Court credited the appellant with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Upon learning of the rumor about his participation, the appellant sought advice and voluntarily went to the police station for interrogation, submitting himself to a paraffin test. This demonstrated his willingness to submit to the authorities' investigation.
Main Doctrine
The Court affirmed the conviction for murder, holding that the victim's ante mortem statement qualified as a dying declaration, and that the defense of alibi was unavailing against positive identification. The Court modified the sentence by crediting the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.