People v. Tienco
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The case originated from a complaint filed against Chan Tienco and several other defendants for violating a municipal ordinance in San Fernando, La Union. The specific charge was the unlawful slaughter of a bovine animal without the permission of the municipal board of health president and the subsequent division of the meat for personal use. The justice of the peace dismissed the charges against all defendants except Chan Tienco, finding sufficient evidence only against him. 2. Procedural History: Chan Tienco was found guilty by the justice of the peace and sentenced to a fine of P40 and costs. He appealed this decision to the Court of First Instance. In the Court of First Instance, a new complaint was filed against Chan Tienco for the same infraction. After trial, the Honorable Richard Campbell found Chan Tienco guilty and imposed a fine of P40, costs, and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Chan Tienco then appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: The appellant, Chan Tienco, argued before the Supreme Court that Municipal Ordinance No. 12 of San Fernando, La Union, was illegal and unconstitutional. His sole ground for appeal was that the ordinance, which regulated the slaughter of bovine animals, was invalid because Act No. 1147 already provided a punishment for slaughtering large cattle without a permit. The appellant contended that the municipal ordinance was in conflict with the general law.
Issue(s)
Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 12 of San Fernando, La Union, is illegal and unconstitutional. Whether the ordinance conflicts with Act No. 1147.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the execution of the sentence of the lower court. The ordinance was declared valid and constitutional.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Municipal Ordinance No. 12 is illegal and unconstitutional: The Court held that a municipality, under proper charter authority, may adopt ordinances on subjects already covered by general law, provided the ordinance is not repugnant to or in conflict with the general law. The Court found that the charter of San Fernando, specifically section 39, paragraphs (r) and (s) of Act No. 82, granted municipal councils the power to provide for and regulate the inspection of food and adopt measures to prevent the spread of disease. Ordinance No. 12, with its article 41, was deemed to fall directly under these authorized powers, as its purpose was to inspect food for the municipality and prevent disease. Therefore, the ordinance was validly enacted. On whether the ordinance conflicts with Act No. 1147: The Court distinguished the purposes of the municipal ordinance and Act No. 1147. Act No. 1147 was enacted primarily to protect large cattle against theft and facilitate their recovery by establishing a system for branding and registry, and regulating transfers. Its object was to keep a record of large cattle and make it difficult for thieves to dispose of stolen animals. In contrast, Municipal Ordinance No. 12, article 41, prohibited the slaughter of large cattle without a permit from the president of the municipal board of health, with the purpose of inspecting the meat for human consumption and ensuring public health. The Court emphasized that the permit from the municipal treasurer under Act No. 1147 concerned the identity and ownership of the animal, while the permit from the president of the municipal board of health concerned the physical condition of the animal as food. These distinct purposes meant the laws were not repugnant. The Court cited the example of liquor sales, where a state license and a municipal permit can both be required for the same activity, constituting separate offenses. Thus, the ordinance did not conflict with the general law.
Main Doctrine
A municipal ordinance prohibiting the slaughter of bovine animals without a permit from the president of the municipal board of health is not illegal or unconstitutional, even if a general law exists that also requires a permit for slaughtering large cattle, because the purposes of the ordinance (public health) and the general law (record-keeping and preventing theft) are distinct and do not conflict.