Seoane v. Franco
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: A mortgage was executed on October 13, 1884, to secure a debt of P4,876.01, with the mortgagor agreeing to pay "little by little." No payments of principal or interest were made. The claim was presented to the plaintiff's intestate estate on August 8, 1911. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the right of action upon the mortgage debt had prescribed. The Petition: The defendant-appellant appealed the decision of the lower court.
Issue(s)
Whether the action to recover the mortgage debt was premature. Whether the right of action to have the court fix the date of maturity of the obligation had prescribed.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the action was premature and that the right of action to fix the date of maturity had prescribed. The Court dismissed the action.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prematurity of the action: The Court held that the obligation, by its nature and the stipulation to pay "little by little," left the duration of the payment period to the will of the debtor. Pursuant to Article 1128 of the Civil Code, when the term of an obligation is left to the will of the debtor, the courts shall fix the duration of such term. The Court cited Eleizegui vs. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club, Barreto vs. The City of Manila, and Levy Hermanos vs. Paterno to support the principle that an action to recover the debt cannot be maintained until the court has fixed a date for its maturity. Therefore, the action filed by the plaintiff was premature as it was brought before the debt became legally due and payable. On the issue of prescription of the action to fix the date of maturity: The Court opined that even if the action were not premature, the right of action to have the court fix the date of maturity had prescribed. Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that rights of action not otherwise excepted must be vindicated within ten years after the Act comes into effect. The right to have the court fix a day for the determination of the time of payment accrued as soon as the instrument was executed, as the period was left to the will of the mortgagor. Since the mortgage was executed in 1884 and the action was commenced in 1911, more than ten years had elapsed since the accrual of the right of action, rendering it prescribed. The Court referenced its opinion in Lichauco vs. Limjuco regarding the advisability of expressing an opinion on the merits even when not strictly necessary for resolution.
Main Doctrine
When an obligation does not fix a term for payment but it can be inferred that the intention was to grant time to the debtor, or when the term is left to the will of the debtor, the courts shall fix the duration of such term. An action to recover the debt is premature until the court has fixed the date of maturity. Furthermore, the right of action to have the court fix such a date prescribes within ten years from the execution of the instrument.