Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. v. Rosario
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Juan Liwanag, an employee of Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Company, filed a suit for damages alleging that he was injured by the company's negligence on October 26, 1911, resulting in the amputation of his left arm. Procedural History: On April 16, 1912, Liwanag filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that the company be ordered to provide him with a monthly pension of P30 during the pendency of the case or to reinstate him in his former position. The court, after hearing arguments from both parties and interpreting Act No. 1874, ordered the company to pay Liwanag a monthly pension of P30 in advance, or, at its option, to employ him at his former wages. The Petition: Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Company filed an action for prohibition against the judge and sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and against Juan Liwanag, seeking to prevent the execution of the order for monthly pension. The company alleged that the order was illegal, that the court lacked jurisdiction, that there was no adequate remedy by appeal, and that great damage would result if the order was executed. The company's main arguments were that the statute, as interpreted, deprived it of property without due process of law, as the court ordered payment without first ascertaining liability through evidence, and that the pension should only continue as long as medical attendance was required, not during the pendency of the action.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the payment of a monthly pension to Juan Liwanag during the pendency of the damage suit. Whether the plaintiff in the prohibition case properly raised the issue of denial of due process and unconstitutionality of the statute in the lower court.
Ruling
The action for prohibition is not maintainable. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff in the prohibition case had not properly laid the foundation for its due process claim by failing to object in the trial court. Furthermore, the Court noted that a mere misconstruction of a statute does not raise a constitutional question or divest the court of jurisdiction, and such errors are to be corrected in the regular way.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the action for prohibition was not maintainable. It found that the plaintiff in the prohibition case had not properly laid the foundation for its due process claim by failing to object in the lower court. The Court emphasized that to raise a question of failure of due process of law, proper objections must be opportunely made in the court below and exceptions taken by the aggrieved party. The failure of due process may be cured by the consent or acquiescence of the party injured. Therefore, the plaintiff's failure to object to the order or take exception thereto in the court below meant that the issue could not be properly raised in the prohibition case. On Issue 2: The Court stated that so far as appears from the allegations and the record, no question was raised as to the constitutionality of the law in the court below, nor was objection made to the form of the motion, the hearing, or the lack of a trial to determine liability upon evidence. Everything in connection therewith seemed to have been done with the acquiescence of all parties. The first time an objection was interposed was when the action for prohibition was filed. The Court reiterated that to raise a constitutional question in the Supreme Court, proper objections must be made in the court below and exceptions taken. The failure of due process may be cured by the consent or acquiescence of the party injured. Thus, the plaintiff's failure to object in the lower court precluded it from raising the due process issue in the prohibition case.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reiterated that a party alleging a denial of due process must properly raise and object to the alleged violation in the lower court proceedings. Failure to do so, and instead acquiescing to the proceedings, constitutes a waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal or in a prohibition case. Furthermore, a mere misconstruction of a statute by a court does not necessarily raise a constitutional question or divest the court of jurisdiction; such errors are typically correctible through ordinary appeal.