Bank Of The Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses Corporation
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against respondent Far East Molasses Corporation (FEMOLA) and others. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of BPI, ordering FEMOLA and L.A. & Co., Inc. jointly and severally to pay BPI P575,043.75 plus interest and attorney's fees. Procedural History: FEMOLA received the decision on July 7, 1987, giving it until July 22, 1987, to appeal. Instead, FEMOLA filed a motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1987, which lacked a notice of hearing. On August 3, 1987, BPI filed a motion for execution of judgment, arguing the decision had become final. FEMOLA then filed a notice of appeal on August 3, 1987. The trial court initially denied BPI's motion for execution on August 10, 1987, finding the defect in the motion for reconsideration was cured. However, upon BPI's motion for reconsideration, the trial court reversed its order on August 24, 1987, granting execution. FEMOLA filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the trial court's August 24, 1987 order and gave due course to FEMOLA's appeal. The Petition: BPI filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that FEMOLA's notice of appeal was not seasonably filed and that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its August 24, 1987 order.
Issue(s)
Whether the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Far East Molasses Corporation tolled the running of the period to appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its order of August 24, 1987.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 24, 1987, granting the motion for execution of judgment. The Court held that the motion for reconsideration filed by Far East Molasses Corporation was a mere scrap of paper for its failure to include a notice of hearing, and thus did not toll the period to appeal. Consequently, the decision of the trial court had become final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the motion for reconsideration tolled the period to appeal: The Supreme Court reiterated the "unrippled doctrine" that a motion which does not contain a notice of hearing is considered a mere scrap of paper and does not merit the court's attention. This requirement under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 of Rule 37, is mandatory. The absence of a notice of hearing is fatal, and the filing or pendency of such a motion does not suspend the running of the period to appeal. The Court emphasized that the alleged curing of the defect by a subsequent "Manifestation and Motion" filed by ordinary mail was insufficient. Firstly, there was no showing that petitioner BPI was furnished a copy, and the messenger's affidavit failed to state the post office of mailing. Secondly, the notice incorporated in the manifestation was directed to the Clerk of Court, not to the parties concerned as required by law. Furthermore, service by ordinary mail is generally not permissible when registry service exists, and the pleading was received by the court only on August 7, 1987, which was beyond the period to appeal. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration was pro forma and did not suspend the period to appeal. On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion: The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion. The appellate court was deemed to have been "oblivious to the foregoing rules and unrippled doctrine" and "extravagantly liberal" to the respondent. The Court found the claim that the Manifestation and Motion was sent by ordinary mail on July 22, 1987, incredible, and considered the notice incorporated therein as invalid. The Court also corrected the Court of Appeals' misinterpretation of the rules regarding the commencement of the period to appeal, clarifying that it should be reckoned from the respective dates each party received the decision, not the latest date any party received it. The Court concluded that the trial court did not commit error when it issued the order of August 24, 1987, granting the motion for execution, as the decision had become final.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration that fails to comply with the mandatory requirement of a notice of hearing is considered a mere scrap of paper and does not toll the running of the period to appeal. Consequently, the judgment becomes final and executory.