People v. De la Peña
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The accused-appellant, Esmenio de la Peña, was charged with and convicted of peddling marijuana, a violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The conviction stemmed from an alleged buy-bust operation conducted by the Narcotics Command. 2. Procedural History: Following his arrest, the accused-appellant executed a counter-affidavit denying culpability. Initially, the Third Assistant City Prosecutor recommended dismissal due to alleged instigation by law enforcement officers. However, this recommendation was reversed by the City Prosecutor, who ordered the filing of an Information. A subsequent petition for review by the Department of Justice denied the dismissal, ruling that the question of instigation versus entrapment was for the court to decide. After arraignment and a plea of not guilty, the prosecution presented its evidence. The accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which was denied by the trial court. The defense then presented its evidence, after which the trial court rendered its judgment. 3. The Petition: The accused-appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution's evidence over his corroborated testimony and in failing to recognize the circumstances of his apprehension as instigation rather than valid entrapment. He contended that the prosecution's evidence was weak and that he should have been acquitted.
Issue(s)
Whether the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the appellant constitute instigation rather than a valid entrapment. Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the signature of the appellant on the receipt for the seized property is admissible in evidence.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, except that the penalty was modified to life imprisonment (Presidential Decree No. 1675, Section 4) instead of reclusion perpetua. Costs were assessed against the accused-appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of entrapment versus instigation: The Court affirmed the Trial Court's characterization of the apprehension as "entrapment" and not "instigation." The Court found the appellant's story, which claimed he consistently denied having marijuana but was induced to look for it due to the poseur-buyer's insistence, to be not credible due to inconsistencies. The prosecution's version was deemed more credible, indicating that the criminal intent originated from the appellant. The Court distinguished entrapment, where the mens rea originates from the criminal, from instigation, where law officers conceive the crime and suggest it to the accused. Sgt. Allaga's inquiry was a query, not a suggestion, and the appellant immediately responded by asking about the quantity and returning with the marijuana. The appellant needed no prodding or inducement, suggesting he was already engaged in the illicit trade. The Court reiterated that entrapment is sanctioned by the Revised Penal Code, while instigation is tabooed. On the sufficiency of prosecution evidence: The Court found no fault with the court a quo for giving credence to the testimony of Sgt. Allaga, which was positive and credible, even if uncorroborated. Sgt. Allaga convincingly established the details of the crime, having been present when information was received, acting as the poseur-buyer, arresting the appellant, and witnessing the issuance of the receipt for the seized marijuana. There was no showing of improper motive on the part of Sgt. Allaga, and he was presumed to have regularly performed his official duty. The Court also found that the marijuana seized was the same item delivered to the PC crime laboratory, with proper safeguards taken to protect its identity, including marking by Lt. Salde and safekeeping in a padlocked steel cabinet. On the admissibility of the appellant's signature: The Court stressed that the appellant's signature on the receipt of the property seized (Exh. C-1) is not a factor in his conviction and is inadmissible in evidence. This is because the signature was obtained in violation of the appellant's right as a person under custodial investigation, as there was nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel at the time. However, the Court held that the appellant's guilt had been adequately established by other evidence of record, rendering the inadmissible signature inconsequential to the conviction.
Main Doctrine
Entrapment is a valid law enforcement operation sanctioned by law, where the criminal intent originates from the accused. Instigation, however, where law officers conceive the crime and suggest it to the accused, is tabooed. The signature on a receipt for seized property obtained during custodial investigation without assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence.