Serra v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership and possession of several lots in Negros Occidental. The Hernaez family initiated proceedings to reconstitute certificates of title for Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, claiming these were lost. After reconstitution and issuance of new titles in their names, the Serra heirs filed an adverse claim and a motion to cancel these reconstituted titles, asserting they held valid existing titles and had been in possession of the properties since before World War II. 2. Procedural History: The Hernaezes' petition for reconstitution was granted, leading to the issuance of new titles. The Serra heirs' subsequent motion to cancel these titles was denied without a hearing by Judge Abiera, who then issued a writ of possession in favor of the Hernaezes. The Serra heirs challenged this writ of possession in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-00139), which initially issued a preliminary injunction but later dissolved it. The Serra heirs then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-34080) challenging the dissolution of the injunction. Concurrently, a separate civil case (Civil Case No. 10040) was filed by the Serra heirs against Felipe Garaygay and SONEDCO concerning the harvesting and milling of sugarcane from the disputed lots. Judge Nestor Alampay issued orders in this civil case, including dissolving a preliminary injunction and later issuing one against the Serra heirs, which were also challenged in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-34693). 3. The Petition: These consolidated petitions, filed under Rule 65, sought writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. In G.R. No. L-34080, the petitioners (Serra heirs) argued that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dissolving the preliminary injunction, which effectively allowed the trial court's writ of possession to be enforced, dispossessing them without a proper adjudication of their claims. They contended that a writ of possession is not proper in a reconstitution proceeding. In G.R. No. L-34693, the petitioners challenged Judge Alampay's orders in Civil Case No. 10040, asserting they were issued with grave abuse of discretion and defied a prior Supreme Court resolution maintaining the status quo. The core arguments revolved around the impropriety of issuing a writ of possession based on reconstituted titles without resolving the underlying ownership dispute and the violation of the status quo orders.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in lifting the writ of preliminary injunction it previously issued. Whether the writ of possession issued by Judge Abiera in a cadastral case for reconstitution of title was proper. Whether the orders of Judge Alampay in Civil Case No. 10040, particularly the dissolution of a preliminary injunction and the issuance of another against the Serras, were issued with grave abuse of discretion. Whether the reconstitution proceedings were valid despite the alleged lack of actual and personal notice to the actual possessors.
Ruling
The petitions are GRANTED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction is SET ASIDE. The writ of possession issued in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163 is declared NULL and VOID. The records are remanded to the trial court for hearing of the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles. Private respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the possession of the properties in question. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on February 15, 1972, shall remain effective until the issue of ownership and/or possession is finally settled.
Ratio Decidendi
On the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals: The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it set aside the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued. This action effectively allowed the enforcement of the void writ of possession, leading to the dispossession of the petitioners. The lifting of the injunction was deemed premature and tantamount to an adjudication on the merits of the main petition, which involved the crucial issue of possession. Therefore, the dissolution of the injunction was an error that necessitated the setting aside of the CA's resolution. On the propriety of the writ of possession: The Court held that the issuance of a writ of possession by Judge Abiera was improper. A writ of possession is available in specific instances such as land registration proceedings, extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, judicial foreclosure of mortgage (under certain conditions), and execution sales. A petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of title does not fall under these categories. Reconstitution merely reproduces a lost title and does not confirm or adjudicate ownership, unlike original land registration proceedings where a writ of possession may be issued to place the applicant-owner in possession. The Court emphasized that a person seeking reconstitution cannot, through a summary motion for a writ of possession, deprive actual occupants of possession; possession and ownership must be threshed out in a separate proceeding. On Judge Alampay's orders in Civil Case No. 10040: The Court found that while Judge Alampay did not abuse his discretion in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining SONEDCO from issuing sugar quedans (as these were based on already consummated acts of possession by the Hernaezes' representative before the Supreme Court's prohibitory injunction), he committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction dated December 29, 1971, against the Serras. This writ enjoined the Serras from harvesting, hauling, and selling sugar cane produced from the lots. The Court reasoned that this injunction went beyond the scope of Civil Case No. 10040, which was for recovery of personal property and damages, and did not put possession in issue. More importantly, it directly contravened the Supreme Court's own writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction in G.R. No. L-34080, which ordered respondents to desist from further dispossessing the petitioners. The issue of possession was pending before the Court of Appeals, and Judge Alampay's order usurped the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals on the matter of possession. On the validity of the reconstitution proceedings and notice: The Court found that the reconstitution proceedings were flawed due to the lack of actual and personal notice to the petitioners, who were the actual occupants and possessors of the properties. While the Hernaezes argued that the order for reconstitution had become final and could no longer be reopened, the Court clarified that if no original title in fact exists, or if an earlier valid certificate of title exists in the name of another person, the reconstituted title is a nullity and the order for its reconstitution does not become final. Such a title may be attacked at any time. The Court reiterated that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles cannot be the subject of reconstitution petitions by third parties without first securing the cancellation of such existing titles by final judgment. The Court stressed that courts have no jurisdiction over such petitions for reconstitution over lands already covered by subsisting titles in the names of their registered owners. The Court also noted that the petitioners' motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles, filed upon learning of their existence, was in the nature of a petition for relief from judgment and was filed within the prescribed period.
Main Doctrine
A writ of possession cannot be issued in a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of title, as reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership. Possession and/or ownership must be threshed out in a separate proceeding. Furthermore, actual possessors of land covered by existing Torrens titles must be given actual and personal notice of any petition for reconstitution, as notice by publication alone is insufficient.