Wong v. Carpio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Manuel Mercado (private respondent) acquired rights to possess a parcel of land (Lot 3, LRC Pcs-295) through a deed of sale with right to repurchase from William Giger in 1972, and a new deed of pacto de retro sale in 1973. Mercado harvested coconuts, paid taxes on the land, but did not reside there, nor did he place anyone to watch it or put up any sign of possession. He knew of defendants' laborers on the land with a hut as early as August 1976 but did nothing, even expressing happiness that people were on the land. Ignacio Wong (petitioner), before July 1976, found no one else claiming the land besides the owner. In July 1976, Wong bought the land from William Giger and his wife, took possession of the title, declared the land for taxation, and attempted to register the sale. Wong placed laborers, built a farmhouse, fenced the boundaries, and put up signboards. On September 27, 1976, Mercado went to the land to make copras, leading to police involvement. On November 18, 1976, Wong hooked coconuts without disturbance. On November 29, 1976, Wong received a complaint for forcible entry filed by Mercado. Procedural History: The Municipal Court of Sta. Maria dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim, finding that petitioner Wong had prior, actual, and continuous physical possession. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur reversed the decision, ruling in favor of Mercado, ordering Wong to return possession and pay monthly rentals of P400.00 from August 1976. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court as it involved a pure question of law. The Petition: Petitioner Wong alleged that the respondent judge erred in concluding he was an intruder without factual or legal basis for forcible entry, and in ordering him to pay monthly rentals without legal or factual basis.
Issue(s)
Whether the entry of petitioner Ignacio Wong into the property is characterized by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth to establish forcible entry. Whether there is a legal and factual basis for the award of monthly rentals to private respondent Manuel Mercado.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur with a modification regarding the computation of rentals. The Court ruled that petitioner Wong's entry was characterized by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, thus constituting forcible entry. The award of rentals was deemed in order, but the computation should commence from December 1976, not August 1976, as petitioner's good faith ceased upon service of summons on November 29, 1976.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of forcible entry: The Court held that possession is acquired by material occupation or by proper acts and legal formalities. The execution of a sale through a public instrument is equivalent to delivery, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. However, if the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing because it is opposed by another, delivery has not been effected. In this case, possession passed from Giger to Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro. The subsequent sale to Wong failed to pass possession because of the impediment posed by Mercado's possession. The Court emphasized that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities, except in cases of co-possession. The rule prefers the present possessor, then the one longer in possession, then the one who presents a title. The Court further clarified that the entry of the petitioner was characterized by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor necessarily implies the exertion of force, and this is all that is necessary. Entering by strategy or stealth is equally obnoxious as entering by force, and the foundation of the action is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The phrase "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" encompasses any situation where one person can wrongfully enter real property and exclude another who has had prior possession. On the issue of rentals: The Court ruled that the award of rentals was in order. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except from the moment facts exist showing that the possessor knows he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, either by extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery by the true owner. The service of summons in a suit for recovery constitutes an interruption of good faith. The records show that petitioner Wong received the complaint for forcible entry with summons on November 29, 1976. Therefore, his good faith ceased on that date, and the computation of monthly rentals should commence from December 1976, not August 1976 as ordered by the respondent judge. The Court cited Manotok Realty vs. Judge Tecson and Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap in support of the principle that possession in good faith is entitled to fruits only until legally interrupted by the service of judicial summons.
Main Doctrine
Possession acquired by material occupation or by proper acts and legal formalities is preferred. In forcible entry, the act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor necessarily implies the exertion of force, which can be through strategy or stealth. Possession in good faith ceases from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor knows he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully, which includes the service of summons.