Cinco v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case stems from a complaint filed by Fredeswinda P. Balana against several individuals, including petitioners Cirilo A. Cinco, Domingo Amaro, Antonio Abalos, and Andres Sabalza, for alleged violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The initial complaints were lodged with the Tanodbayan (now the Office of the Special Prosecutor) starting in April 1981, with subsequent complaints filed in June 1982. The petitioners, who were employees of the Sumoroy Agro-Industrial School, submitted counter-affidavits and supplemental counter-affidavits in their defense during the preliminary investigation stages. Procedural History: The preliminary investigation, initiated in 1981, involved the submission of various affidavits by the parties. The investigation was nearing resolution when the assigned prosecutor was appointed to the judiciary in 1986. A resolution recommending prosecution was issued in July 1987, and informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan in September 1987. The accused filed a motion to quash these informations, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, which held that the Tanodbayan lacked authority to conduct preliminary investigations and direct the filing of cases with the Sandiganbayan after February 2, 1987. The Sandiganbayan granted this motion, dismissing the cases without prejudice to the State's right to conduct a new preliminary investigation. Subsequently, the complainant requested the re-filing of the cases, leading to a new preliminary investigation by Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero. The petitioners requested to file under separate charges according to new rules, but this was denied. The complainant opted to adopt her previous charges and evidence, and the petitioners failed to submit controverting evidence, which was construed as a waiver. Prosecutor Guerrero then issued a resolution finding prima facie cases, which was approved by the Ombudsman, leading to the filing of new informations in August 1989. The Petition: The petitioners filed a motion to quash the new informations, arguing they were void due to violations of Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, that the filing officer lacked authority, and that the informations did not substantially conform to prescribed forms. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion. Consequently, the petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, raising similar assignments of error. They contend that the Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling the informations void for violating procedural rules, in not finding the filing officer without authority, and in not finding the informations substantially defective. The core of their argument is that a new preliminary investigation should have been conducted, and that the previous proceedings, even if partially valid, were insufficient to support the new charges without a full reinvestigation and proper adherence to procedural requirements, including the specific designation of offenses and the opportunity to present controverting evidence.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave and serious error in not ruling that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 13827-32 are null and void for violating Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court as amended, necessitating a new preliminary investigation. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed serious and grave error in not ruling that the prosecutor who filed the informations had no authority to do so. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed serious and grave error in not finding that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 13827-32 do not conform substantially to the form prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court, particularly regarding the certification.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The resolution of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division dated February 23, 1990, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's denial of the motion to quash, holding that a new preliminary investigation was not warranted. The Court explained that the preliminary investigation proceedings initiated in 1981 and 1983 were valid because the Tanodbayan was clothed with authority at that time to conduct such investigations. The nullity arising from the Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan ruling only pertained to the filing of the informations by the Tanodbayan after February 2, 1987, not the entire preliminary investigation process itself. Therefore, the existing evidence and affidavits submitted during the 1981-1983 investigations remained effective and valid. To compel a completely new preliminary investigation would be inutile and repetitious, as the same facts and evidence would be re-elicited. Furthermore, the Court noted that Prosecutor Guerrero's directive for Balana to adopt her charges and evidence, and for petitioners to submit controverting evidence, effectively afforded petitioners a fresh opportunity akin to a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners' failure to submit countervailing evidence after being given this chance amounted to a waiver of their right. The Court also reiterated, citing Bernabe, Jr., et al. v. Rosario, that a bill of particulars is a procedural device applicable to informations filed in court for trial, not to complaints initiating a preliminary investigation which merely seeks to establish probable cause. On Issue 2: The Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the prosecutor who filed the informations lacked authority. Following the dismissal of the initial informations based on Zaldivar, the cases were re-filed under the authority of the Ombudsman, who had proper jurisdiction. The preliminary investigation was validly continued by Special Prosecutor Officer III Eleuterio F. Guerrero, and his resolution was approved by the Hon. Ombudsman, thereby vesting him with the requisite authority to file the new informations. The Sandiganbayan's earlier statement in its July 5, 1988 resolution, suggesting the Ombudsman could conduct a 'new preliminary investigation,' was classified as mere obiter dictum, lacking the force of an adjudication and not a binding directive for an entirely fresh start. The Court emphasized that courts generally do not interfere with the full discretion and control of the prosecution by the fiscal or Special Prosecutor. On Issue 3: The Supreme Court found no merit in the petitioners' argument that Special Prosecutor Guerrero's certification was irregular or deficient. Citing Estrella v. Ruiz, the Court held that if a preliminary investigation was actually conducted, the absence or even deficiency of a certification by the investigating fiscal is not fatal and does not vitiate the information. In the instant cases, a preliminary investigation was demonstrably held, and petitioners were afforded two opportunities to submit controverting evidence (in 1981-82 and again in 1989 by Prosecutor Guerrero). The certification, which stated that a preliminary investigation had been conducted and there was sufficient ground to believe the crime was committed and the accused were probably guilty, is presumed to have been regularly held in accordance with law. The Court further clarified that the phrase "sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief" is equivalent to "reasonable ground to believe," both conveying the same thought regarding probable cause, as demonstrated by Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
Main Doctrine
The nullity of a preliminary investigation proceeding due to the lack of authority of the investigating officer does not necessarily extend to the entire investigation if portions thereof were conducted with proper authority and by validly appointed officials. A subsequent investigation, if it adopts the valid portions of the prior proceedings, may be considered as a continuation and not a new investigation, especially when the parties have already submitted their evidence.