People v. Reyes
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Cresencia C. Reyes was charged with three counts of violating Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 and two counts of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 818. The Estafa charges stemmed from the issuance of bouncing checks. Under PD 818, the penalty for Estafa is increased to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds a certain threshold. Procedural History: On March 12, 1991, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, convicted Reyes in all cases. In Criminal Case No. 86-51209 (Estafa), she was sentenced to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua. Despite the conviction and the severity of the penalty, the RTC allowed her to remain on provisional liberty under a corporate surety bond posted on May 16, 1991. The cases were elevated to the Supreme Court due to the imposition of the reclusion perpetua penalty. The Appeal: The First Division of the Supreme Court referred the matter to the En Banc to determine whether Reyes should be allowed to remain on bail during the pendency of her appeal. The core issue was whether the constitutional and procedural rules denying bail to those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua apply to Estafa, which is a crime against property, especially after a conviction has been rendered by the trial court.
Issue(s)
Whether an accused convicted of Estafa and sentenced to reclusion perpetua under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 818 is entitled to remain on bail pending appeal. Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua applies to sentences exceeding twenty (20) years but less than thirty (30) years.
Ruling
The Supreme Court RESOLVED to ORDER the bondsman to surrender the accused-appellant within ten (10) days and REQUIRED the RTC to order her transmittal to the Bureau of Corrections. The Court held that the accused is NOT entitled to remain on bail.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Issue of Bail: Under the 1987 Constitution, bail is a matter of right except for those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. This replaced the old rule which only denied bail for 'capital offenses' (those punishable by death). The Court notes that the framers of the Constitution were aware of existing laws like PD 818 that prescribed reclusion perpetua for certain crimes. Because the Constitution makes no distinction between types of crimes, the non-bailable nature applies to any offense carrying that penalty. Consequently, the right to bail is lost when the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong. The Court rejects the suggestion that Estafa should be treated differently because it is a crime against property rather than a 'heinous' crime against persons. It is a matter of legislative policy to determine which offenses are sufficiently grave to warrant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court takes judicial notice that large-scale Estafa and professional swindling cause untold misery and undermine the banking system. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 818 specifically aimed to curb the upsurge of bouncing checks to protect trade and commerce. Thus, the legislative categorization of Estafa as a non-bailable offense via the penalty of reclusion perpetua must be respected. The Court applies the guidelines established in People v. Cortez (1991) regarding the cancellation of bail upon conviction. Cortez dictates that when an accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and is convicted by the trial court, the bond shall be cancelled. The accused must then be placed in confinement pending the resolution of the appeal. This rule ensures that the accused is available for the execution of the sentence should the conviction be affirmed. Since Reyes was convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, her provisional liberty must be terminated. The Court utilizes the principle of contemporanea expositio to interpret the constitutional provision on bail. The members of the Constitutional Commission were presumed to know that certain felonies, including Estafa under PD 818, were already punishable by reclusion perpetua. By not excluding these crimes from the non-bailable provision, the intent to include them is clear. The Court cannot engage in judicial legislation to create exceptions that the Constitution itself does not provide. Therefore, the explicit language of the Constitution and the Rules of Court must be applied strictly to the case at bar. On the Duration of Reclusion Perpetua: The Court clarifies that reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to reclusion temporal in the graduated scales of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Since reclusion temporal has a maximum of twenty (20) years, it follows by necessary implication that the minimum of reclusion perpetua is twenty (20) years and one (1) day. While Article 70 of the RPC uses thirty (30) years as a basis for the three-fold rule and pardon eligibility, it does not mean the penalty itself only begins at thirty years. To hold otherwise would create a legal lacuna for penalties between 20 and 30 years. Therefore, the 22-year sentence imposed on Reyes under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 818 is legally categorized as reclusion perpetua.
Main Doctrine
The 1987 Constitution's prohibition on bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong applies to all such offenses, including Estafa as amended by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 818. The Court clarifies that reclusion perpetua has a logical minimum of twenty (20) years and one (1) day, and any penalty exceeding the maximum of reclusion temporal (20 years) falls within its range. Consequently, a conviction for Estafa resulting in a sentence of reclusion perpetua necessitates the immediate cancellation of bail and the confinement of the accused pending appeal, following the guidelines in People v. Cortez.