Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involves a criminal charge of Estafa for P50,000.00 filed against petitioner Franco Gorion by Bonifacio Bacaltos. The information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City on October 17, 1989, and docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-16726 with Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. 2. Procedural History: Petitioner Gorion was arraigned on March 12, 1990, and pleaded not guilty. The case was set for pre-trial and trial. A hearing scheduled for September 27, 1990, was cancelled by the court upon motion of the prosecution, with the agreement of the defense, to reset the hearing for October 4, 1990. However, the case was erroneously included in the trial calendar for September 28, 1990. On that date, the court, noting the absence of the prosecution's witnesses and counsel, issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. Petitioner's counsel received this dismissal order on October 4, 1990. Subsequently, on July 2, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the dismissal constituted an acquittal and that proceeding with the case would violate his right against double jeopardy. The trial court, in an order dated August 9, 1991, set aside its previous dismissal order, deeming it issued without due process due to a stenographer's error in transcription and the case's erroneous inclusion in the calendar. The court also denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on September 18, 1991. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Franco Gorion filed this petition for certiorari on October 2, 1991, seeking to set aside the trial court's orders of August 9, 1991, and September 18, 1991. He reiterates his arguments that the dismissal order of September 28, 1990, amounted to an acquittal, and that the subsequent setting aside of this order and the denial of his motion to dismiss were rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner contends that proceeding with the case would place him in double jeopardy, as prohibited by the Constitution and procedural rules. The public respondents, through the Solicitor General, argue that the dismissal order was void for lack of due process and thus could not be the basis for a double jeopardy claim.
Issue(s)
Whether an order dismissing a criminal case after arraignment, issued through inadvertence or mistake during a cancelled hearing, can be set aside by the court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Whether the dismissal order dated September 28, 1990, was valid and could be invoked by the petitioner to claim double jeopardy.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The respondent Court is directed to immediately place Criminal Case No. CBU-16726 in its trial calendar for the reception of the evidence of the parties and thereafter to decide the same.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether an order dismissing a criminal case after arraignment, issued through inadvertence or mistake during a cancelled hearing, can be set aside by the court without placing the accused in double jeopardy: The Supreme Court held that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to issue the dismissal order on September 28, 1990, because the case had been effectively removed from its trial calendar by the order of cancellation issued the previous day. The inclusion of the case in the calendar was a mistake, attributed to the stenographer's failure to transcribe the order, but the judge, clerk of court, and prosecution should also bear responsibility for not noticing the discrepancy. The erroneous dismissal order was issued capriciously and arbitrarily, violating the State's right to due process by depriving it of a fair opportunity to present its case. Such a void order cannot be used to bar the annulment of the dismissal or the reopening of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court reiterated the principle that a dismissal order issued without due process is null and void and does not terminate the first jeopardy. On the issue of whether the dismissal order dated September 28, 1990, was valid and could be invoked by the petitioner to claim double jeopardy: The Court found that the dismissal order of September 28, 1990, was null and void because the trial court lost its jurisdiction to issue it and violated the prosecution's right to due process. Consequently, Criminal Case No. CBU-16726 continued to be pending as if the void order had not been issued. The three requisites of double jeopardy were not met: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense. Legal jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, with a valid plea, and when the case was dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. In this case, the termination was not valid due to the void dismissal order, and the petitioner could not invoke double jeopardy.
Main Doctrine
An order of dismissal issued due to inadvertence or mistake, without affording the prosecution due process, is void and cannot be invoked to support a claim of double jeopardy.