Del Castillo v. Aguinaldo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents owned a three-story, three-door commercial building. They allowed Tan Ching Hai and spouses Domingo and Ester Tan to use the building for residential purposes only, with the agreement that the premises would be surrendered upon demand. The Tan spouses used the building for business from January 1970 until 1977, when respondents asked them to vacate. They refused. Petitioner Rhodora del Castillo was also allowed to stay in the premises, and portions were converted into a factory, violating the original agreement. Petitioner del Castillo agreed to vacate by January 31, 1981, with a grace period until February 28, 1981, but failed to do so. Procedural History: Respondents filed a civil case for damages and recovery of possession with an application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On March 19, 1981, the trial court granted the application and issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering defendants to vacate. On March 26, 1981, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to verify the complaint, but without a notice of hearing. On April 10, 1981, the trial court issued two orders: one declaring petitioner in default, and another denying the motion to dismiss. On April 18, 1981, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and Motion to Dismiss. On April 20, 1981, the trial court rendered a decision against petitioner. The Petition: Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and injunction, seeking to annul the trial court's order granting the preliminary mandatory injunction and to question the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action or suit. Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and placed the plaintiffs in possession of the property.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing the order.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction and the nature of the action: The Court reiterated the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action are determined by the averments in the complaint. The complaint alleged that demand to vacate was made in 1977, and the case was filed in 1981. Since the filing was more than one year after the termination of possession, the proper action was an accion publiciana or an action for recovery of possession, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not an ejectment case cognizable by city or municipal courts. The Court distinguished this from unlawful detainer, which involves withholding possession for not more than one year after the termination of the right to hold possession. Therefore, the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and declaring petitioner in default: The Court held that petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" was fatally defective because it did not contain a notice of the time and place of hearing, as required by Rules 15, Sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Rules of Court. Such a motion, not complying with the rules, does not stay the running of the reglementary period to file an answer. Consequently, the trial court's Order of Default and subsequent Judgment of Default were in order. The averments in the defective motion to dismiss could therefore be disregarded. The issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was also deemed proper given the factual antecedents and the nature of the action.
Main Doctrine
A motion to dismiss that fails to comply with the rules on notice of hearing is a fatally defective piece of paper with no legal effect, and does not stay the running of the reglementary period to file an answer. Consequently, an order of default and subsequent judgment by default are in order.