Macalincag v. Chang
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns an administrative charge filed against Roberto E. Chang, the acting municipal treasurer of Makati. The charge, approved by Victor C. Macalincag, Undersecretary of Finance, and signed by Lorinda M. Carlos, Executive Director of the Bureau of Local Government, alleged dishonesty, neglect of duty, and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Specific allegations included disbursing funds during an election ban, improper disbursement of funds for financial assistance and employee merienda, incurring significant cash overdrafts, transferring municipal funds to another safe, and failing to remit national collections. 2. Procedural History: Following the administrative charge and an order of preventive suspension issued on October 6, 1989, Roberto E. Chang filed a petition for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC initially issued a temporary restraining order, then denied the application for a preliminary injunction, sustaining the Secretary of Finance's power to suspend. However, upon a motion for reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered its order, granted the injunction, and subsequently issued a decision on October 24, 1990, ordering the petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing the preventive suspension order. This decision led to the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: This case comes before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the RTC's decision. The petitioners argue that the order of preventive suspension became effective upon Chang's receipt, not upon the designation of a replacement, and that it predated Executive Order No. 392, thus not being subject to its provisions. They also contend that the power to suspend is not an incident of the power to appoint. The petitioners assert that the Secretary of Finance, as an alter ego of the President and head of the Department of Finance, had the jurisdiction to issue the preventive suspension order, as the municipal treasurer's office falls under his department and the issuance was in accordance with Civil Service Law.
Issue(s)
Whether the Order of Preventive Suspension became effective upon receipt by the respondent or upon the designation of an officer-in-charge. Whether the issuance of Executive Order No. 392, creating the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) and vesting appointment powers in the President, divested the Secretary of Finance of the power to issue a preventive suspension order against a municipal treasurer; and whether the Secretary of Finance has the jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against the acting municipal treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The assailed Order dated October 24, 1990, of the Regional Trial Court is NULLIFIED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the effectivity of the Order of Preventive Suspension: The trial court's ruling that the preventive suspension order was incomplete and could not take effect until an acting municipal treasurer was appointed to replace the respondent is untenable. Preventive suspension is governed by Section 41 of P.D. 807 (Civil Service Law), which does not require the designation of a replacement to give effect to the suspension. While Section 156 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) provides for the temporary assumption of duties by the assistant or next-in-rank officer in case of suspension, this does not negate the effectivity of the suspension order itself upon receipt by the suspended official. The designation of an officer-in-charge is immaterial to the effectivity of the suspension, as a contrary view would render nugatory the purpose of preventive suspension. The order of preventive suspension became effective upon respondent Chang's receipt thereof, which is presumed when he filed a complaint to prevent its implementation. On the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Finance and the effect of Executive Order No. 392: The argument that Executive Order No. 392, which vested the power to appoint municipal treasurers in Metro Manila in the President, divested the Secretary of Finance of the power to suspend is incorrect. Section 8 of Executive Order No. 392 explicitly states that appointments are made "subject to the Civil Service law, rules and regulations." Prior to Executive Order No. 392, the power to appoint was vested in other officials but was always subject to Civil Service Laws and the approval of the Secretary of Finance. The intention of these legislations was to adhere to Civil Service Laws. The power to discipline is specifically vested under Section 37 of P.D. No. 807 in heads of departments, agencies, provinces, and chartered cities who have original jurisdiction to investigate and decide disciplinary matters. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is under the Department of Finance, making the Secretary of Finance the proper disciplining authority. Therefore, the acting Secretary of Finance, Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction in issuing the order of preventive suspension. Furthermore, even assuming that the power to appoint includes the power to discipline, the acting Secretary of Finance, as an alter ego of the President, acted within his authority as such alter ego to preventively suspend the respondent.
Main Doctrine
The Secretary of Finance, as the proper disciplining authority under the Civil Service Law, has the jurisdiction to issue an order of preventive suspension against a municipal treasurer, even if the appointment power has been transferred to the President, as the power to discipline is an incident of administrative supervision and not solely dependent on the power to appoint.