Fernando v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Marcelo Fernando, then Undersecretary of Finance, and Salvador Mison, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The charge stemmed from allegations that they gave unwarranted benefits to J.F. Tabajonda Construction by splitting a contract exceeding P5,000,000.00 into eight smaller contracts for the repair and renovation of the Bureau of Customs Building. This alleged splitting of the contract was purportedly done to avoid public bidding and favor J.F. Tabajonda Construction, which was awarded four of the eight contracts. Procedural History: A complaint was filed against the petitioners and others by a former Bureau of Customs employee. After a preliminary investigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor initially recommended prosecution. However, subsequent reviews led to recommendations for dismissal due to insufficient evidence. The Ombudsman, disagreeing with these recommendations, ordered the filing of an information with the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14461. The petitioners moved to defer their arraignment, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its December 3, 1990 orders, leading to the setting of arraignment dates. These orders are the subject of the present petitions. The Petition: These consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul the Sandiganbayan's December 3, 1990 orders denying the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and setting their arraignment. The petitioners argue that there is no prima facie case against them, citing the lack of evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence, or undue injury, and the fact that the Commission on Audit found no grounds for disallowance of the disbursements. They contend that the splitting of the contract was justified by the urgency of the repairs and that proper authority was obtained, negating any claim of manifest partiality or unwarranted benefits. The Solicitor General, in his comment, agreed that there was no prima facie case against the petitioners.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court may interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause. Whether there exists a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Ruling
The petitions are GRANTED. The petitioners are dropped from the Information in Criminal Case No. 14461 for lack of probable cause.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that while it generally follows a policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers, it will step in when there has been a manifest misapprehension of facts. The Court emphasized that judicial bodies are not part of the prosecution service and should not blindly comply with erroneous manifestations. In this case, the Ombudsman's finding that the DOF approval was 'curative' was belied by the records, which showed the documents existed long before the investigation. Applying the principle in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, the Court noted that the purpose of a preliminary investigation is to protect the innocent from oppressive prosecution. On Issue 2: There is no prima facie case because the essential elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are absent. First, there was no 'manifest partiality' as Tabajonda was the lowest bidder, and other contracts were awarded to different firms. Second, there was no 'evident bad faith' or 'gross negligence' because the petitioners sought and obtained the necessary signing authority from the Secretary of Finance and the President before proceeding. Third, there was no 'undue injury' to the government; the repairs were completed, and the COA post-audit found no grounds for suspension or disallowance. The Court cited Alejandro v. People to reiterate that criminal liability under this section requires proof of injury or unwarranted benefit, neither of which was present here.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court generally refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman's discretion in filing criminal informations; however, this policy yields when the records clearly show a lack of probable cause or a misapprehension of facts by the investigating body. For a charge under Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to prosper, the prosecution must establish that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits. In the absence of evidence showing overpricing, poor construction, or injury to the government, and where the transactions were post-audited and cleared by the Commission on Audit (COA), the criminal charges must be dismissed.