People v. Villarama, Jr.
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (possession of 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrochloride or Shabu). The penalty prescribed is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Procedural History: The accused pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution rested its case, the accused manifested his willingness to change his plea to a lesser offense, violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended (failure to keep records for regulated drugs), which carries a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos. The respondent Judge initially set promulgation of decision and directed the accused to secure the prosecutor's consent. The prosecutor filed an opposition, citing that the prosecution had already rested its case, the possibility of conviction was high, and valuable time would be wasted. The accused filed a reply, arguing that the Rules do not fix a specific period for such a request. On February 25, 1991, the respondent Judge granted the motion, citing liberal construction of rules for just, speedy, and inexpensive determination and humanitarian considerations, and sentenced the accused to two years and one day of prision correccional, a fine of P2,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment, and forfeiture of the drug. The prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied, with the respondent Judge opining that the consent of the fiscal as the offended party was not absolute in "victimless crimes" and suggesting the need for guidelines from the Fiscal's Office. The Petition: The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the decision and order of the RTC, arguing that the respondent Judge erred in granting the request to plead guilty to a lesser offense because it was filed out of time and the consent of the prosecutor and offended party was not obtained, and in convicting the accused of the lesser offense in view of the absence of a valid change of plea.
Issue(s)
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in granting the private respondent's request to plead guilty to a lesser offense because the request was filed out of time and the consent thereto of the prosecutor and the offended party was not obtained. Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in convicting the private respondent of the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of violation of Section 16 of the same law, in view of the absence of a valid change of plea, and whether double jeopardy applies.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The judgment and order of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial on the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The temporary restraining order issued is made permanent.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of granting the request to plead guilty to a lesser offense and the requirement of consent: The Court held that plea bargaining is a process subject to court approval, usually made during the pre-trial stage, but the law permits changes thereafter. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense. However, this acceptance is not a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In cases where the prosecution has already rested its case, jurisprudence dictates that such a plea should only be allowed when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. The trial court's decision must be based on the evidence already in the record, not as a form of compromise or bargaining. The respondent judge's ruling failed to demonstrate an assessment of the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence, dwelling instead on the least persuasive objection of waste of time, while ignoring the other valid grounds raised by the fiscal. The Court disagreed with the argument that only the fiscal's consent is needed in "victimless crimes" like violations of RA 6425. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear: the consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution and is duty-bound to prosecute the proper offense. Furthermore, the Court clarified that in crimes under RA 6425, the State is the offended party, as these acts endanger society and the family. The Fiscal, representing the government, acts on behalf of the State. Therefore, the consent of the offended party, the State, must be secured from the Fiscal. On the issue of the validity of the conviction for a lesser offense and double jeopardy: The Court stated that the supposition that the change of plea and conviction to a lesser offense is no longer open to review due to double jeopardy is without basis. The right against double jeopardy under Section 2, Rule 116 applies only when both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the change of plea. Since this was not the situation, the more pertinent provision is Section 7, Rule 117(c), which states that a conviction shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged if the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party. Thus, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge due to the lack of consent.
Main Doctrine
The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is not demandable as a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Such discretion must be exercised judiciously, considering the evidence on record, and requiring the consent of both the fiscal and the offended party, with the State being the offended party in drug-related offenses.