Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioner Federation of Free Workers (FFW) was declared the authorized bargaining representative after a certification election, and subsequently executed a memorandum of agreement with private respondent Aris (Philippines), Inc. (company) on February 3, 1978. This agreement recognized FFW as the bargaining representative and stipulated that FFW would administer the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which included a "no strike – no lockout clause," until a new CBA was executed. Following a failure in negotiations for a new CBA, leading to a deadlock, FFW filed a notice of strike on February 28, 1978. Despite conciliation efforts, no accord was reached, prompting FFW to request the Acting Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction on March 29, 1978. Subsequently, on April 1, 1978, after the required notice period, FFW commenced a strike. 2. Procedural History: The company, classified as a vital industry, filed an urgent motion to declare the strike illegal and revoke the April 2, 1978 order, while also applying for clearance to terminate employees. The striking employees were placed under preventive suspension. On April 11, 1978, the respondent Deputy Minister of Labor declared the strike illegal, ordered striking employees (excluding union officers) to return to work, revoked the April 2, 1978 order, modified the wage increase, granted clearance for the preventive suspension of union officers, and placed union administration under FFW. Subsequently, on April 11, 1978, the company and FFW entered into a memorandum of agreement to resolve the dispute and strike, followed by a CBA on April 12, 1978. On January 29, 1979, the Deputy Minister granted the application for clearance to terminate the services of eighteen (18) union officers and members. 3. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction, seeking to annul the decisions dated April 11, 1978, and January 29, 1979. Their primary argument was that the April 2, 1978 order had become final and executory and therefore could not be revoked. In response to this petition, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on March 30, 1979.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Deputy Minister gravely abused his discretion when he revoked his former order dated April 2, 1978; and whether the petitioners properly availed of a petition for certiorari. Whether the strike was legal, and whether the termination of services of the petitioners was justified.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decisions of the Deputy Minister of Labor dated April 11, 1978, and January 29, 1979, are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 30, 1979, is LIFTED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of revocation of the April 2, 1978 order and the propriety of the certiorari petition: The Court held that the respondent Deputy Minister did not gravely abuse his discretion in revoking his previous order dated April 2, 1978. The order dated April 2, 1978, never attained finality because the petitioner union broke its commitment to lift the strike by resuming blockades, erecting tents, and circulating new leaflets. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the proper remedy against the April 11, 1978 decision was an appeal to the Office of the President, which the petitioners failed to pursue. The Court reiterated the principle that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error. Since the petitioners deliberately allowed the period for appeal to lapse and the decision to lapse into finality, they cannot now contest the legality of the decision through a petition for certiorari. On the legality of the strike and the termination of services: The Court affirmed the Deputy Minister's declaration that the strike was illegal. The employer was engaged in a vital industry protected by PD 823, the Secretary of Labor had assumed jurisdiction, and the parties had agreed to maintain the status quo. Moreover, the strike activities, including massive human barricades and coercive methods, were deemed illegal. Citing Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., the Court stated that a strike undertaken despite an assumption or certification order from the Secretary of Labor is a prohibited and illegal activity, and union officers and members who knowingly participate lose their employment status. As the individual petitioners actively participated in the illegal strike, their termination was justified.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal due to the petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. The remedy of appeal must be pursued seasonably; otherwise, the decision sought to be reviewed becomes final and executory, precluding recourse to certiorari.