Mariategui v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Lupo Mariategui died intestate on June 26, 1953, leaving properties acquired before his third marriage. He had children from three marriages. His first two marriages produced descendants who are parties to this dispute. His third marriage, to Felipa Velasco, produced three children: Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina. The dispute centers on Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate, which was adjudicated in an extrajudicial partition among descendants of the first and second marriages on December 2, 1967, and subsequently registered under Act No. 496, resulting in the issuance of OCT No. 8828 and subsequent transfer certificates of title. Procedural History: On April 23, 1973, Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina Mariategui (children from the third marriage) filed an amended complaint seeking partition of their father's estate and annulment of the 1967 extrajudicial partition, alleging they were deprived of their rightful shares in Lot No. 163 and other properties. The defendants (petitioners) moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint was for recognition of natural children and was time-barred. The trial court denied this motion. However, on February 16, 1977, the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove their status as children of Lupo Mariategui. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Petition: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision on December 24, 1980, declaring all children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina, entitled to equal shares. The appellate court directed reconveyances or reimbursement for the shares of the third marriage children and ordered a project of partition. The defendants-appellees (petitioners) sought reconsideration, which was denied. They then filed this petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, raising issues of prescription and the successional rights of the private respondents, arguing that the action was one for recognition and was barred by prescription, and that the private respondents failed to prove their status as legitimate children. The Supreme Court, however, determined the action was principally one for partition, not recognition, and found sufficient evidence to establish the legitimate filiation of the private respondents, thus affirming the Court of Appeals' decision.
Issue(s)
Whether prescription barred the private respondents' right to demand partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, considering the nature of the action and the alleged fraudulent repudiation of co-ownership. Whether the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and the implications for the validity of the repudiation of co-ownership.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980, is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On prescription and repudiation of co-ownership: The Court held that an action for partition is imprescriptible as long as the co-ownership has not been validly repudiated. The registration of Lot No. 163 by the petitioners in their names in 1971 did not constitute a valid repudiation because it was done fraudulently, excluding the private respondents. Prescription commences from the discovery of the fraud. Since the private respondents filed their action in 1973, shortly after learning of the registration, prescription had not yet set in. For prescription to terminate co-ownership, repudiation must be clearly made known to the other co-owners, with clear and conclusive evidence, and followed by open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the statutory period. The petitioners' act of executing an extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registering the properties in their own names was deemed an act of repudiation, but it was not valid because it was done fraudulently. The Torrens title does not shield fraud, and registration is not equivalent to notice of repudiation when fraud is involved. The Court found that the petitioners fraudulently withheld the private respondents' shares, and prescription could only commence from the discovery of this defraudation. On the proof of successional rights and its effect on repudiation: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that the private respondents were legitimate children of Lupo Mariategui. Lupo and Felipa Velasco deported themselves as husband and wife and were known as such in the community. Although no marriage certificate was presented, no evidence controverted this fact. The Court applied the presumption of marriage and legitimacy. Jacinto's birth certificate served as a record of birth establishing legitimate filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code. The continuous possession of the status of children by Julian and Paulina, coupled with an affidavit from one of the petitioners acknowledging them as siblings, further supported their claim. The trial court itself mentioned an affidavit from Cresenciana Mariategui Abas acknowledging Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina as her siblings through their father. Because the private respondents were proven to be legitimate children, the extrajudicial partition excluding them was fraudulent, thus invalidating the repudiation of co-ownership.
Main Doctrine
An action for partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches, provided that the co-ownership has not been validly repudiated. Registration of property in the name of some co-owners, to the exclusion of others, may constitute repudiation, but only if such repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners and is accompanied by open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the period required by law. Fraudulent withholding of a co-heir's share prevents prescription from running.