Re: Inquiry on Cube
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Judge Enrique A. Cube was appointed Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 22, Manila. Information was received by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) that he had previously been dismissed as Assistant Fiscal of Pasay City. Procedural History: An inquiry was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator. Records from the Department of Justice indicated that Fiscal Enrique A. Cube was found guilty of gross misconduct and dereliction of duty for failure to prosecute a criminal case, leading to its dismissal with prejudice. Consequently, Administrative Order No. 341 was issued on September 27, 1972, removing him from office. The Petition: Judge Cube applied for appointment to the Judiciary in 1992. In his Personal Data Sheet (PDS), he answered "Optional under RA 1145 effective 1996" to the question of whether he had ever been retired, dismissed, forced to resign for reasons other than lack of funds. He also answered "No" to having any pending administrative or criminal cases. The Supreme Court reviewed his explanations and the circumstances of his previous dismissal.
Issue(s)
Whether Judge Enrique A. Cube committed dishonesty in his application for appointment to the Judiciary by failing to disclose his previous dismissal from government service. Whether the nature of his dismissal ("without prejudice") and subsequent re-employment and optional retirement absolved him from the duty to disclose the prior removal from office.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed Judge Enrique A. Cube from the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits. The decision was immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of dishonesty in the application for appointment: The Court found that Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty by failing to disclose his previous dismissal from public service. His explanation that the dismissal was "without prejudice" and that he had since returned to government service and optionally retired was deemed a "clever evasion" and not a satisfactory explanation. The Court emphasized that the fact of dismissal for gross misconduct and dereliction of duty was a significant matter that the JBC should have been aware of in acting on his application. By deliberately suppressing this fact, the Council was misled into believing he had a clean record, which was essential for appointment to the Judiciary. The Court reiterated the principle that appointees to the judiciary must possess integrity and probity, as required by the Constitution, and that concealment of relevant facts bearing on fitness for judicial office demonstrates a lack of these qualifications. On the nature of dismissal and subsequent employment: The Court held that the circumstance that his dismissal was "without prejudice" was not material, nor was his subsequent appointment to a municipal position or his optional retirement. The core issue was the non-disclosure or concealment of the fact that he was removed as Assistant City Fiscal. The Court rejected his attempt to equate dismissal with retirement, stating that his separation in 1972 was not blameless, as he was found guilty of serious offenses. The Court pointed out that dismissed or forced to resign employees are generally not qualified or entitled to retire, highlighting the fundamental difference between these modes of separation and optional retirement. Therefore, his claim that the latter part of Question No. 25 (". . . , dismissed or forced to resign,") was not applicable to him because he had optionally retired was a mischaracterization of the situation and an attempt to evade the truth.
Main Doctrine
Concealment of a previous dismissal from public service, even if the dismissal was purportedly "without prejudice" and occurred many years prior, constitutes dishonesty rendering an individual unfit for appointment to the Judiciary. Such non-disclosure misleads the appointing authority and violates the constitutional requirement of integrity and probity for judicial appointees.