Carreon v. Mendiola
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Complainants Crispin Carreon and Norma Rufino-Carreon charged respondents Eduardo Mendiola and Roberto Merrera, Deputy Sheriffs, with Gross Misconduct. The complainants alleged that on August 15, 1990, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in an ejectment case. On the same day, respondent Mendiola visited the complainants to collect P7,000.00, which they did not pay. On August 17, 1990, Mendiola levied upon several personal properties of the complainants and scheduled an auction sale. On August 25, 1990 (a Saturday), Mendiola, accompanied by Merrera and five demolition crew members, demolished the complainants' house without a demolition order. Merrera allegedly chased a person taking pictures of the demolition. The complainants claimed actual damages of P50,000.00. Procedural History: Respondents contended that the demolition was pursuant to a court order granting execution pending appeal and that a special demolition order was not required. They claimed Merrera was merely a witness. Complainants replied that the demolition violated Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The case was referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City for investigation. The Executive Judge found respondents guilty of grave misconduct and recommended suspension for one month. The Supreme Court, however, reviewed the case. The Petition: The complainants prayed for the investigation and punishment of the respondents. Subsequently, they prayed for the dismissal of both respondents from the service.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondents, as deputy sheriffs, committed grave misconduct, gross ignorance of duties, oppression, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in demolishing the complainants' house. Whether a special demolition order was required under Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court for the removal of improvements on the property subject of execution. Whether the respondents acted with conspiracy, malice, and bad faith in executing the demolition.
Ruling
The Supreme Court found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the duties pertaining to their office, oppression, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. They were ordered dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except for the monetary value of their accrued leave credits.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the respondents committed grave misconduct, gross ignorance of duties, oppression, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service: The Court held that the respondents committed grave misconduct, gross ignorance of duties, oppression, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. This was based on their blatant disregard of the safeguards prescribed in Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. They demolished the complainants' house despite the order setting aside the writ of execution pending appeal. The Court emphasized that the demolition aspect of a writ of execution pending appeal cannot be implemented without a special order for that purpose, as mandated by Section 14, Rule 39. The respondents failed to observe these pre-conditions, and their insistence that a special order was not necessary demonstrated a deliberate disregard of the law or gross ignorance of their duties. As deputy sheriffs, they were expected to know better than to misinterpret the law. The Court cited previous rulings in Folloso vs. Director of Lands, Guevarra vs. Laico, Rom vs. Cobadora, and Basco vs. Alcantara to underscore the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements for demolition. On whether a special demolition order was required under Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court: The Court unequivocally stated that Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court is the governing law on the matter of removing improvements on property subject to execution. This provision clearly states that the officer shall not destroy, demolish, or remove such improvements except upon a special order of the court, issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing, and after the judgment debtor has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. In this case, the judgment creditor did not apply for such an order. Furthermore, the writ of execution pending appeal, which the respondents claimed as their authority, was already set aside by the MTC on August 22, 1990, after the complainants filed a supersedeas bond. Therefore, when the demolition occurred on August 25, 1990, the writ had ceased to have legal efficacy, and the respondents had no right, power, or authority to demolish the house. The Court stressed that ignorance of the MTC's order setting aside the writ was not a valid defense, as it was incumbent upon the respondents to verify the status of the writ before proceeding with the demolition. The demands of accountability and responsibility under the Constitution require such diligence. On whether the respondents acted with conspiracy, malice, and bad faith: The Court found that the transgression was clearly aggravated by notorious bad faith and malice. This was evident from the fact that the respondents conducted the demolition on a Saturday, a day when no court was open to hear the complainants had they decided to seek immediate redress. The claim of respondent Merrera that he was merely requested by respondent Mendiola to act as a witness and protector was deemed unmeritorious. Merrera, being a deputy sheriff of another branch, had no business attending to the writs of Mendiola's branch unless authorized. There was no law requiring a sheriff to act as a witness in another sheriff's proceedings, nor was there any showing that Mendiola was threatened or intimidated. The Court concluded that the respondents conspired together and helped each other to commit the acts complained of. This conspiracy and malicious intent underscored the gravity of their misconduct.
Main Doctrine
Deputy sheriffs are found guilty of grave misconduct, gross ignorance of duties, oppression, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for demolishing a house in blatant disregard of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court and despite an order setting aside the writ of execution pending appeal. Their actions were aggravated by notorious bad faith and malice, including conducting the demolition on a Saturday when the court was closed. Respondent Merrera's claim of merely acting as a witness was deemed unmeritorious, and the respondents were found to have conspired.