Sy Bang v. Mendez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan (complainants) filed an administrative case against Judge Antonio Mendez, Sr. (respondent) for gross impropriety, blatant partiality, serious irregularities, and knowingly issuing unjust orders in Civil Case No. 2137-G. The case involved two lots with an ice plant, originally owned by DBP and leased to Suarez Agro-Industrial Corporation (corporation). The corporation became delinquent in rental payments, leading DBP to demand they vacate. DBP subsequently sold the properties to the complainants, who then filed an ejectment suit against the corporation. The corporation, in turn, filed an action for specific performance and annulment of sale with preliminary injunction against DBP and the spouses before the Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 90-3511). The spouses' motion to dismiss for improper venue was denied, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. The Court of Appeals declared the Makati RTC devoid of authority and ordered the dismissal of the case, denying a subsequent motion for reconsideration. While the Makati case was pending, the corporation filed the same action before the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62, presided over by respondent judge, who was also the pairing judge for Branch 61. Respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary mandatory injunction upon the corporation's posting of a bond. The spouses' motion to dismiss the Gumaca case for pendency of another action was denied by the respondent judge as moot and academic. Procedural History: The Court referred the complaint to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation. The investigating justice submitted a report detailing the facts and making recommendations. The Supreme Court reviewed the report and the parties' arguments. The Petition: The complainant-spouses charged the respondent judge with lack of jurisdiction to hear cases outside his territorial jurisdiction, issuing unjust orders without proper process, approving a questionable bond, issuing an order to break open premises without hearing, prematurely submitting a case for decision, and knowingly approving a bond from a bankrupt surety company.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent judge committed gross impropriety, blatant partiality, serious irregularities, and knowingly issued unjust orders. Whether respondent judge had jurisdiction to hear Civil Case No. 2137-G. Whether respondent judge committed forum shopping. Whether the preliminary mandatory injunction was improperly issued. Whether the bond approved by respondent judge was defective. Whether respondent judge improperly acted on the spouses' motion to dismiss before the scheduled hearing.
Ruling
The Supreme Court censured respondent Judge Antonio Mendez, Sr., and admonished him to exercise greater care and be more circumspect in the performance of his official duties. The Court found that while the judge did not commit infractions regarding jurisdiction or forum shopping, his premature denial of the motion to dismiss without a hearing was highly improper and cast doubt on his impartiality.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Charge of Gross Impropriety, Blatant Partiality, Serious Irregularities, and Knowingly Issuing Unjust Orders: While several specific charges were made, the primary finding of impropriety relates to the handling of the motion to dismiss. The Court's overall assessment of the judge's actions contributes to this determination. On the Jurisdiction of Respondent Judge: The Court, applying the principle that jurisdiction over a case is conferred by law upon all RTC branches in general within a province, found that respondent judge had jurisdiction to hear Civil Case No. 2137-G. The issue of venue, which deals with the locality of the suit, could be waived by the parties, and the spouses, by filing their answer with a counterclaim, had waived any defect in venue. The Court cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court to support the principle that a trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss a case for improper venue as it is the defendant's prerogative to object, and failure to do so timely constitutes a waiver. On the Charge of Forum Shopping: The Court found no forum shopping attributable to the respondent judge. It explained that the filing of the case in Gumaca was due to the absence of a presiding judge in Calauag and the need for urgent action on the corporation's prayer for injunction. The Court noted that the Court of Appeals had dismissed the Makati case, and while a motion for reconsideration was pending, the circumstances did not compel a conclusion that the respondent judge consented to forum shopping. The Court reiterated that seeking a remedy in a court with proper authority, after a previous dismissal due to improper venue, does not violate the rule against forum shopping. On the Impropriety of the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction: The Court deferred making a definitive finding on the propriety of the preliminary mandatory injunction, noting that the issue was still sub judice before the Supreme Court. However, it clarified that the order to break open the premises was merely an implementation of the writ and did not require a separate hearing. The Court also explained that the statement regarding the case being submitted for decision within twenty days referred to the application for the preliminary mandatory injunction, not the merits of the case itself, and that the issuance of the writ on May 14, 1991, was within the allowable period from the issuance of the TRO on April 24, 1991. On the Approval of a Defective Bond: The Court found no evidence that the respondent judge knew of the surety company's bankruptcy or blacklisting at the time of the bond's approval in May 1991. The telegram advising of the suspension of the surety's authority was received by the judge in February 1992, long after the bond was approved. The rules do not require a hearing for bond approval if the judge is satisfied with the surety's solvency, and no petition for lifting the injunction based on bond insufficiency was filed. On Improperly Acting on Defendant's Motion Before the Set Date for Hearing: This was the primary ground for censure. The Court found that the respondent judge's immediate denial of the spouses' motion to dismiss on May 21, 1991, for being moot and academic, even though the hearing was set for May 23, 1991, and a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Court of Appeals, was highly improper. This premature denial without granting the complainants a chance to be heard created a perception of partiality and cast a cloud on the judge's integrity, independence, and impartiality, violating the code of judicial conduct.
Main Doctrine
A judge who acts with gross impropriety, blatant partiality, serious irregularities, and knowingly issues unjust orders, even if the substantive issues are eventually resolved, may still be subject to disciplinary action. The premature denial of a motion to dismiss without hearing, especially when based on pending related cases, can cast doubt on a judge's impartiality and integrity.